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 The purpose of this thesis is twofold.  One, I look to provide an unconventional yet 
plausible externalist account of the relationship between moral judgment and motivation.  Two, in 
defending my externalist account, I present arguments against its counterpart internalist view.  
Regarding one, the framework of my position rejects both internalism and the Humean theory of 
motivation.  In other words, I propose that the connection between moral judgment and motivation 
is intrinsic and contingent at the same time – that is, while the source of moral motivation is internal 
to moral judgment, it is not necessarily the case that moral judgments will always motivate.  
Regarding two, I specifically target an internalist account which I believe adequately contrasts to 
my position: Michael Smith’s cognitivist internalist view.   
 Smith argues that a fully rational agent would desire accordingly to the normative reasons 
she accepts.  Therefore, internalism is true and any agent who acknowledges some normative reason 
ii 
 
for action yet is not motivated appropriately is in some sense practically irrational.  I question the 
idea that moral judgments are constrained by norms of rationality by providing arguments aimed to 
show that moral judgments are not subject to requirements of consistency, a key tenet of rational 
behavior.  I further argue that internalist views such as Smith’s make the mistake of conflating the 
action-guiding nature of morality to motivation; that is, what it means for something to be 
normative and for that something to be motivating. 
 In asserting my externalist position, I argue that within the deliberative processes of making 
a moral judgment, there are at least two distinct forms of commitment made understood as judging 
what is (morally) best and judging to do that which is (morally) best.  This distinction between two 
ways of holding a moral judgment is then elaborated upon to show that it is the latter which is most 
aptly connected to motivation.  Finally, I argue that the operative state within such moral judgments 
responsible for motivation is a higher degree of commitment by the agent whereby she turns an 
essential impersonal moral imperative into a personal imperative. 
 I conclude by addressing an internalist argument against the plausibility of an amoralist 
known as the inverted commas objection.  Smith’s version of the objection claims that an amoralist 
lacks ‘sufficient mastery of moral concepts’.  I respond by arguing that Smith’s account fails to 
accommodate a certain type of amoralist: one who has recently become that way.  Additionally, I 
supplement my argument by claiming that the inverted commas objection conflicts with the part of 
our intuition that is influenced primarily by observational evidence. 
 
Keywords: Cognitivism, Externalism, Humean Theory of Motivation, Internalism, Inverted 
Commas Objection, Moral Judgment, Motivation, Non-Cognitivism 
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 Moral motivation is generally understood as a type of normative motivation – a force that 
seems to compel us towards wanting to act in accordance with our moral judgment.  Often times 
this phenomenon is explained by the idea that when we judge something to be morally right or good, 
not only does the moral judgment then give us a reason to act accordingly or such action seems 
rational to take, but we also therefore tend to be moved.  One of the more interesting aspects of 
moral motivation is that it can often conflict with an agent’s non-moral values or other preferences 
in that, frequently, there seems to be an opposition between self-interested desires and the norms of 
morality (or what one thinks she ought to do).  In fact, it often seems to be the case that one has to 
make sacrifices of one’s desires in order to follow the moral good.  Furthermore, what seems to 
complicate our goal of trying to understand moral motivation is that sometimes there seems to be 
such a reliable connection between moral judgments and motivation; while at other times, there 
seems to be such spectacular failure of motivation following moral judgment.  Trying to explain this 
inconsistency is a crucial aspect of motivational research and has led to the two opposing views of 
motivational internalism and externalism.  
 One may pose the question why we should care about the relationship between moral 
judgment and motivation in the first place.  Such a person might think ‘so what?’ if motivation 
necessarily arises whenever a moral judgment is made; or if motivation is contingent upon some 
other, external factor outside of moral judgment.  Why should that affect my personal beliefs 
regarding what is right or wrong?  To provide one answer to this sort of query, if nothing else, 
understanding the relationship between moral judgment and motivation has a direct impact in 
further understanding the entire meta-ethical landscape.  And this is important because there is no 
doubt a great amount of disagreement in meta-ethics.   
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 In the introductory chapter of his book, The Moral Problem, Michael Smith makes 
precisely this point in considering why there is so much disagreement in the domain of meta-ethics.  
He suggests that the reason for disagreement can be traced back to two distinctive features of 
morality which carry implications that pull in opposite directions; with the conflict being further 
exasperated by what he calls ‘the standard picture of human psychology – a picture we owe to 
Hume (1888)’.
1
  Smith calls this ‘the moral problem’ and provides a succinct layout of the conflict 
by presenting each of the two features of morality he mentions plus the Humean account of human 
psychology in the form of three apparently inconsistent propositions regarding the relationship 
between moral judgment and motivation. 
1. Moral judgments of the form ‘It is right that I ’ express a subject’s beliefs about an 
objective matter of fact, a fact about what is right for her to do. 
2. If someone judges that it is right that she s then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to . 
3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a 
means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume’s terms, distinct existences.
2
 
The first assumption is simply the cognitivist view that judgments are beliefs, or an agent’s 
representation of certain aspects of the world.  The second is a version of the motivational 
internalist’s claim that moral judgments necessarily entail motivation.
3
  The third claim reflects the 
Humean theory of motivation.  This view expresses the general Humean thought that non-cognitive 
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 Smith 1994: 7. 
2
 Ibid: 12. 
3
 To be more accurate, this is a particularly weak form of motivational internalism.  To see this, consider the 
following two forms of weak internalism.  The first asserts a defeasible connection between moral judgment 
and action: though moral judgments necessarily motivate, this moral motivation can be overridden by 
countervailing motivation and thus not lead to any action corresponding to the moral judgment.  In contrast, 
the second (even weaker) form, which is reflective of Smith’s view, asserts a defeasible connection between 
moral judgment and motivation itself.  Thus, Smith’s view can accommodate the idea that an agent making a 
moral judgment may not even have any motivation at all, which seems to make his view particularly 
amenable to externalism. 
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states, such as desires or pro-attitudes, are necessary psychological states for motivation and that 
cognitive mental states such as beliefs are conceptually or modally independent from non-cognitive 
mental states such as desires or pro-attitudes.  Even though not everyone accepts each of these three 
claims, nonetheless, the claims have some intuitive appeal and show a certain degree of plausibility, 
at least individually.  However, combined it is obvious that there is an inconsistency; that not all 
three together can be true.
4
  Therefore, in order to avoid a contradiction, we must reject at least one 
of the three claims. 
 Non-cognitivists reject claim one, asserting that a moral judgment is some form of a non-
cognitive attitude.  The motivational externalist rejects claim two, saying that a moral judgment 
(represented as a cognitive state), at least in and of itself, cannot motivate.  Rejecting assumption 
three is known as non-Humeanism.
5,6
  Non-Humeanism can take two forms.  Some who reject 
assumption three propose that beliefs in themselves can sufficiently motivate without requiring any 
non-cognitive, desire-like state.  The alternate form concedes that both a belief-like state and a 
desire-like state are necessary for motivation, but that belief-like states and desire-like states have 
                                                          
4
 A simplified explanation of the inconsistency is as follows.  (1) tells us that moral judgments express belief-
like mental states.  (2) claims for a necessary connection between such belief-like states and motivation.  
However, (3) claims that a desire-like state is necessary for motivation but also that there is no necessary 
connection between a belief-like state and a desire-like state, hence rebutting the conjunction of (1) and (2).   
Strictly speaking however, it could be argued that there is no contradiction in Smith’s version of the three 
premises.  This is because, as partly explained in the previous footnote, Smith’s version of internalism (2) has 
a ceteris paribus clause, that belief and motivation can come apart.  In order for there to be a contradiction, 
(2) would most likely have to be read as: (2*) Necessarily, if someone judges that it is right that she s, then 
she is motivated to . 
5
 Many authors use the term ‘anti-Humeanism’ instead of ‘non-Humeanism’ to reflect a contrasting view to 
the Humean theory of motivation.  If there is a distinction between anti-Humeanism and non-Humeanism, I 
would imagine that the anti-Humean position is more directly opposed to what is entailed by the Humean 
theory of motivation, whereas the non-Humean position is not so much concerned with going against the 
Humean view, but rather offers a different view that is simply not in line with Humeanism.  I am not quite 
sure if this is correct or if there is any more to it than that.  But if we grant this distinction here, because I 
believe that the stronger position of anti-Humeanism might restrict what can be entailed or represented by 
the view I look to forward, I opt to use the non-Humean terminology to depict the position contrasting 
Humeanism in my thesis. 
6
 David Brink notes that internalists who accept cognitivism (those who accept Smith’s assumptions one and 
two) but deny the third assumption can also be called ‘rationalists’.   
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some conceptual connection to each other in that a normative belief can produce the desire-like 
state necessary for motivation. 
 Now as I have said, in order to hold a coherent picture, it suffices to simply reject one of the 
three views.  However, I reject both assumptions two and three (at least loosely stated).  But a mere 
denial of internalism and Humeanism is not what I set out to do in this thesis.  Rather, I look to 
‘throw my hat’ into the internalist/externalist debate by offering an externalist account which tries 
to expand the limits to how we should understand the relationship between moral judgment and 
motivation unlike what has been traditionally suggested by either internalists or externalists so far.
7
  
Therefore, I simply take externalism and non-Humeanism as the framework from which I present 
my position: and that is to argue for an intrinsic yet contingent connection between moral judgment 
and motivation.  In other words, I argue that while the source of motivation is connected to the 
moral judgment – as opposed to being external to it – it is a contingent relationship nonetheless. 
 The main focus of my thesis is to provide an externalist account of the relationship between 
moral judgment and motivation, one that stands against Smith’s internalist account.  Although 
admittedly this might be too simplistic, it could be understood that the main difference between 
Smith’s account and a more generic internalist view is, one, regarding the nature of moral 
judgments – that they are cognitive mental states rather than non-cognitive – and, two,  the role of 
practical rationality insofar as motivation is concerned.  Thus, chapter II focuses on laying out 
precisely what Smith’s cognitivist internalist account amounts to, and then following with 
externalist arguments against Smith’s view.  More specifically speaking, after providing an account 
of Smith’s view, I argue against the necessary connection between rationality and motivation, 
clarify what the externalist account is claiming, as well as provide an account of what I think is a 
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 Of course, I do not wish to imply that therefore my proposed view is a completely new and original 




mistake the internalists make in their assertion for the necessary connection between moral 
judgments and motivation.  I claim that they conflate the ‘action-guiding’ nature of morality with 
motivation: that is, between what is meant for something to be normative and for that thing to be 
motivating. 
 I mentioned that I also reject the Humean theory of motivation.  The non-Humean aspect of 
my thesis should be understood as a mere secondary consequence to my internalist/externalist 
discussion, reflected by my stance.  I provide a cursory explanation in regard to this throughout 
chapter III.  However, I do not go into much detail arguing for non-Humeanism as I think that 
would dilute from the main purpose of my paper, which is to discuss motivational 
internalism/externalism.  The overall objective of chapter III will focus on developing my 
externalist position of the intrinsic yet contingent relationship between moral judgment and 
motivation.   
 The manner by which I look to support my externalist position is by first proposing that 
there is more than one way an agent can hold a moral belief (which is reflected by moral judgments 
of the forms ‘ is right’ and ‘I/one ought to ’).   The purpose of proposing two ways of holding a 
moral belief is to support the externalist intuition that there are some propositional forms of moral 
judgments that seem to lack motivational force, from an agent’s psychological perspective.  
Specifically speaking, although I acknowledge that moral judgments of the form ‘ is right’ are 
logically connected to moral judgments of the form ‘I/one ought to ’, I argue that they differ in 
respect to their relationship to motivation.  What this means is that, while ultimately the connection 
between either propositional form of a moral judgment to motivation can be understood as being a 
contingent one, I will argue that the morally motivated agent is one who perceives her moral 
judgment as not only being in the form of a moral imperative (so the ‘I/one ought to ’ form), but 
furthermore as a personal imperative.  That is, I argue that motivation follows a moral judgment 
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when the agent personally engages with the normative content of her moral judgment, which entails 
a difference in the level of commitment by the agent towards the normative content.   
 The purpose of chapter IV is to discuss the ‘inverted commas objection’: a prominent 
internalist argument against the idea that an agent can make a sincere moral judgment without being 
motivated.  Since my externalist position posits a contingent connection between moral judgment 
and motivation – and so allowing for the possibility that an agent can make a moral judgment 
without being motivated – this objection is one that holds features regarding the relationship 
between moral judgment and motivation that necessarily contradict my view.  Therefore, by 
providing compelling arguments against the inverted commas objection, I will be able to address 
the criticism against the plausibility of someone who can make a moral judgment and not be 
motivated, and hence strengthening my own position. 
 The first half of chapter IV will consist in a discussion of the inverted commas argument in 
its generic form.  I introduce what this argument amounts to in its most general sense and offer 
initial concerns over the formulation of the argument.  I question whether the foundation of the 
objection, that the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation is a conceptual 
truth, can really be asserted as a conceptual truth.  I then present an example of what the inverted 
commas objection could amount to and how the externalist presentation of the plausibility of an 
‘amoralist’ differs from such an objection.   
 In the latter half of chapter IV, I present a specifically cognitivist internalist version of the 
inverted commas objection, namely Smith’s.  The reason for this is that since my externalist 
position can be understood as considering moral judgments to be belief-like cognitive states, I can 
respond to a non-cognitive internalist charge of inverted commas usage against me, not by 
defending against the inverted commas objection specifically, but by simply denying that moral 
judgments should be understood as non-cognitive (conative) states that are necessarily motivating.  
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But a cognitivist internalist’s charge of making moral judgments in an inverted commas sense takes 
as its starting point the same position as mine regarding the nature of moral judgments.  Therefore, 
such a cognitivist internalist’s charge of inverted commas usage is a much more unambiguously 
applicable argument against my position; and it is such a position that I need to specifically address.   
 Therefore the latter half of chapter IV will mainly comprise of laying out what Smith’s 
inverted commas objection entails, followed by my argument against his claims.  In the last section 
of this chapter, I expand on a specific aspect of Smith’s version of the inverted commas objection 
that seems to be particularly amicable towards my proposed account of being able to hold moral 
beliefs in more than one way.  The aspect in question refers to the possibility that an amoralist’s 
judgment is not different in kind from that of a moral agent’s, but might instead just be missing 
some element that is otherwise present in a moral agent’s judgment.  I suggest that this missing 
element is precisely the agent engaging with the moral content, understood as a difference in the 
level of commitment by an agent towards the normative content of the moral judgment. 
 Before delving into these three chapters that comprise the main portion of my thesis, in the 
upcoming first chapter, I provide an initial acquaintance to the topic by going over variations of 
motivational internalism, as well as providing an explication of motivational judgment externalism.  
The purpose of chapter I is twofold.  For one, I look to get readers who are not yet quite familiar 
with this subject matter a chance to gain some background knowledge before going into my positive 
account.  The second purpose is to allow the more knowledgeable reader to transition more 
smoothly into my proposal.  However, even if there is some confusion after reading this chapter – 
because there are so many distinctions and variety of sub-categories one has to be aware of – it 





I. An Initial Acquaintance with the Topic 
 
 Trying to provide a comprehensive landscape of all the available varieties of views 
involved in the debate on the relationship between moral judgment and motivation is an improbable 
task for this thesis.  Luckily, for the dual purpose of providing a general acquaintance to the topic, 
as well as for gaining a better understanding of my view, it suffices to sketch the rough outline that 
comprises this chapter.  However, I note once again that the following outline should not be 
considered anywhere near all-inclusive for what is entailed by motivational internalism and 
externalism.   
 So to begin with, consider one common perception regarding moral judgments – that they 
seem to be of such a nature that when an agent utters a statement to the effect ‘it is right to φ’, she 
could not sincerely make such a statement without being motivated in some sense by that judgment 
herself.  As mentioned in the introduction, this idea is called motivational internalism.  Internalism 
simply means that there is some internal (necessary) connection between moral judgments and 
motivation.  However, there are many different variations of motivational internalism – each with 
the aim of laying out a more conceptually plausible picture regarding moral motivation – that need 
to be distinguished.  For example, is the internalist asserting that a moral judgment is, in and of 
itself, a motivational state; motivating due to psychological factors in an agent; or because moral 
judgments contain moral content which necessarily have motivating properties?  These are just a 
few of the myriad internalist ways we can understand the relationship between moral judgments and 
motivation.
8
   
 
1.1. Taxonomy of Motivational Internalism 
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 It should be inferred that for any particular version of internalism there is a counterpart externalist view 
available.   
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 The first type of variation distinguishes between different types of sources that are 
responsible for motivation when an agent makes a moral judgment (whatever the nature of a moral 
judgment is).  The following various types of motivational internalist views are not necessarily 
considered to be at odds with each other but are rather just completely independent views.  The 
views in question are called existence internalism, internalism about reasons (or reasons 
internalism), and judgment internalism. 
 The term existence internalism was developed by Stephen Darwall.
9
  The underlying idea is 
that the normative status of a certain moral fact or entity – the contents of a moral judgment – 
necessarily motivates any agent that gains cognitive access to it.  More specifically, this view holds 
that it is part of the makeup of the moral fact or object that it possesses the power or property to 
motivate.  For one, this view clearly supports moral realism, that metaphysical entities known as 
moral facts or truths do exist in this world.  For another, because this view holds that motivation 
necessarily arises regardless of any psychological impediments from the agent, it is a particularly 
extreme moral realist view.  Existence internalism is often understood in terms of Plato’s ‘Form of 
the Good’, and it is this version of internalism which J.L. Mackie refers to when rejecting moral 
realism in his well-known ‘Argument from Queerness’ objection.
10
 
 Reasons internalism is generally understood as a form of existence internalism and asserts 
that (i) a moral judgment gives an agent some reason in favor of it, and (ii) that the reason will 
necessarily give the agent some motivation to act.  This view is credited to Bernard Williams who 
argues for a conceptual connection between moral action and what he calls a person’s ‘subjective 
motivational set’.  According to Williams, a person’s subjective motivational set – which is 
primarily discussed in terms of desires – includes many elements such as ‘dispositions of evaluation, 
                                                          
9
 Darwall 1992: 155. 
10
 Mackie 1997: 38-42. 
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patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects’.
11
  Furthermore, a person’s 
subjective motivational set is not static; deliberative processes can have all sorts of effects on it in 
terms of addition, subtraction and revisions of elements contained in the set.  The basic argument by 
Williams for reasons internalism is that when an agent believes herself to have a reason for action, 
she will necessarily be motivated because such reasons can only come about due to something in 
the agent’s ‘subjective motivational set’ which already contains some desire regarding the content 
of the reason. 
 Judgment internalism, on the other hand, states that an agent cannot sincerely make a moral 
judgment without having some motivation corresponding to the judgment: that it is part of the 
psychology of an agent and the nature of moral judgments that when an agent makes a sincere 
moral judgment, she can only be doing so if she is also motivated accordingly.  One way to 
differentiate between this view and existence internalism is that, whereas existence internalism is 
more of a metaphysical view regarding certain motivating properties that moral content possess, 
judgment internalism relies more on psychological explanations focusing on the concept of (moral) 
judgment itself and how to properly understand the idea of an agent making a judgment.  It is this 
last view of motivational judgment internalism that is pertinent for this paper and will prominently 
be dealt with in the discussions to follow. 
 
1.2. Three Divergent Views on Motivational Judgment Internalism/Externalism  
 While section 1.1 provided a distinction between different possible types of sources of 
moral motivation, the distinction in this section is specific to the third type – judgment internalism – 
and is between two different concepts on the nature of a moral judgment.  The two views can be 
understood as cognitivism and non-cognitivism regarding the nature of moral judgments and they 
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11 
 
present quite a divergent understanding of the relationship between moral judgment and motivation.  
Add to that the externalist picture, and we have three differing views in the debate on the 
relationship between moral judgment and motivation: cognitive internalism (CI), non-cognitive 
internalism (NCI), and externalist realism (ER).
12
  Unlike in 1.1 where the three views were not at 
odds with each other and were rather three independent views, the three views mentioned here are 
directly opposed to each other in one way or another.  Therefore the best way to understand each 
view (as well as the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism) is by doing a direct 
compare and contrast between the three.  I start by comparing and contrasting CI and NCI. 
 As one might guess CI and NCI share in common the ‘internalist’ aspect of the relationship 
between moral judgment and motivation.  What this means is that both views consider motivation to 
be intrinsically, or necessarily, connected to a moral judgment.  Motivation will necessarily be 
entailed when an agent makes a sincere moral judgment.  The way the two views differ is in the 
mechanism involved in how such motivation is necessarily connected to moral judgment.  First, CI 
asserts that moral judgments are belief-like cognitive mental states.  What this entails is that CI 
understands moral judgments as being fact-stating propositions, at least from the agent’s point of 
view.  This does not mean that every moral judgment reflects a moral truth substantively, but rather 
that the content of the moral judgments are apt for evaluations of truth or falsity.  Furthermore, CI 
understands such belief-like cognitive states to be able to motivate and do so necessarily.  Thus, CI 
asserts that a belief-like state is sufficient somehow in guaranteeing moral motivation that 
corresponds to the moral belief. 
 Opposingly, NCI asserts that moral judgments represent non-cognitive (or conative) mental 
states such as desires or pro-attitudes.  Since non-cognitive mental states are not fact-stating, the 
moral judgments expressed are not subject to truth or falsity.  Also, due to the very nature of 
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conative states – they are considered to be motivationally efficacious – NCI is a view that serves as 
a natural explanation for why motivation necessarily has to follow a moral judgment.  That is, if 
moral judgments simply are (either conceptually) or express (as representations of) non-cognitive 
mental states such as desires or pro-attitudes, then it just follows that they are motivational states.   
 In contrast to both CI and NCI, ER considers the relationship between moral judgment and 
motivation to be contingent.  It is not necessarily the case that an agent making a moral judgment 
will be motivated accordingly.  ER compares to CI in that both positions take the nature of moral 
judgments to be belief-like cognitive states.  However, unlike CI, ER denies the possibility that a 
belief-like state can sufficiently motivate on its own.  ER compares to NCI in that both positions 
advocate for some non-cognitive desire-like state as the crucial element necessary for motivation to 
occur.  However, unlike NCI, which has the desire-like state built into the moral judgment, ER 
considers the desire-like state to be external to the moral judgment and not a necessary occurrence 
when a moral judgment is made.  This then accounts for why NCI sees the relationship between 





1.3. Regarding the Efficacy of Motivation Following Moral Judgment 
 So far I have given distinctions based on different possible types of sources of moral 
motivation and distinctions based on the nature of moral judgments themselves.  In this section I lay 
out an important distinction between various degrees of strength, or to what extent, motivation is 
necessarily entailed from a moral judgment.   
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 Since my position supposes non-Humeanism, so arguing that moral judgments are belief-like cognitive 
states, I am explicitly narrowing the range of views to exclude any non-cognitivist position.  Thus any 
arguments from and against internalism in this thesis should be understood as specifically addressing the 
cognitivist internalist position unless noted otherwise. 
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 Motivational judgment internalism can be broadly divided into two categories of strong and 
weak motivational internalism.  Within the strong class of motivational judgment internalism, there 
is a further distinction that can be made.  The first strong view is simply the idea that moral 
judgments necessarily motivate simpliciter.  That is, this view inevitably pushes the motivation 
entailment all the way to yielding action and is therefore a particularly extreme view indeed.  We 
can call this view Strong Act (Motivational Judgment) Internalism (SAMJI) and is differentiated 
from Strong Motivational (Judgment) Internalism (SMJI), as phrased by Nick Zangwill.
14
  SMJI 
contrasts with SAMJI in that it is a view that deals only with motivation rather than with both 
motivation and action.  This view states that moral motivation overrides all other motivations.  That 
is, even though an agent may fail to actually act upon the moral motivation – perhaps ‘due to 
failures of rationality or opportunity’ – nonetheless, the motivation that arises from a moral 
judgment is the agent’s strongest motivation.  In contemporary philosophy, neither of these views 
that fall under the ‘strong’ category are widely accepted for: (i) it seems clear that at least 
sometimes, we do not act according to what we judge we morally ought to do; and (ii) for being too 
restrictive in that it is unable to account for cases such as weakness of will, akrasia, 
mental/psychological disorders or impairments, and so on. 
 Thus, generally proposed concepts of judgment internalism fall in the ‘weak’ category 
which we can call Weak (Motivational Judgment) Internalism (WMJI).  WMJI is simply the view 
that while moral judgments necessarily entail corresponding motivation, this motivation may not be 
the strongest and can be overridden by countervailing motivations.  ‘Countervailing motivations’ is 
to be understood broadly as not only simply being overwhelmed by conflicting desires, but also 
encompassing forms of practical irrationality such as suffering from some form of weakness of will, 
akrasia, mental/psychological disorders or impairments, and the like.  What is important is that, 
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even though weak internalists thus admit that these countervailing motivations may lead to an agent 
not being moved to act upon their moral motivations, nonetheless such moral motivation does exist 
even to the slightest degree when an agent makes a moral judgement.   
 However, as I had briefly mentioned in footnote 3, Smith’s version of weak motivational 
internalism is even weaker than this general weak internalist view.  The main difference between 
Smith’s weak internalist view and WMJI can be understood as that, for Smith, when moral 
motivation is overridden by said countervailing motivations, the connection between moral 
judgment and motivation can be severed completely.  In other words, moral judgments motivate 
ceteris paribus – the relationship between moral judgments and motivation is a defeasible one.  I 
will lay out in more detail what Smith’s weaker internalist view entails in section 2.1.  
 
1.4. Motivational Judgment Externalism 
 The general externalist intuition is illuminated in the following phrase by Christine 
Korsgaard, “a conjunction of moral comprehension and total unmotivatedness is perfectly possible: 
knowledge is one thing and motivation another.”
15
  In other words, the idea that forms of (moral) 
knowledge and motivation are necessarily connected is a view that needs to be argued for by the 
internalist and shown to be the case.  The agent who reflects the position described by Korsgaard 
here goes by many names in the literature such as ‘the cynic’, ‘the skeptic’, ‘the indifferent or 
listless person’, or ‘the amoralist’.  While there are arguably conceptual differences on a more acute 
level, for the most part I will refer to the amoralist as encompassing all the previously mentioned 
titles.   
 On the most basic level, the core of any externalist view maintains a rejection of the 
necessity condition insofar as the connection between moral judgment (or the moral content/reasons) 
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and motivation is concerned.  Any connection between moral judgment and motivation is asserted 
as only being a contingent one.  How this contingent connection is elaborated on can take various 
forms.  Perhaps the most common externalist method is one which posits that some form of a 
conative state (such as a desire), which is external to the moral judgment, is necessary in order for 
motivation to occur.  This is often referred to as the agent’s ‘desire to be moral’.
16
  This type of 
argument emphasizes that the source of moral motivation does not reside in the moral judgment 
itself but outside of it, as reflected by Thomas Nagel’s statement that “externalism is compatible 
with the view that… motivation is always present – so long as its presence is not guaranteed by 
moral judgments themselves, but by something external to ethics.”
17
    
 Also, the externalist position does not need to argue for the possibility that an amoralist is 
never motivated by the moral judgments she makes.  The externalist needs only to argue that, at 
least on a single occasion, it is conceptually possible for an amoralist to make a sincere moral 
judgment without being correspondingly motivated.  What this also entails is that the internalist 
position does not become vindicated simply by providing a successful argument that amoralists do 
not in fact exist.  Rather, the internalist must show that it is conceptually impossible for an amoralist 
to exist.  However, just as the internalist is faced with the burden of giving an argument for the 
conceptual impossibility of the existence of an amoralist, the externalist has to provide a compelling 
argument for the conceptual possibility of an amoralist – someone who can sincerely make a moral 
judgment without having any sort of corresponding motivation.  Many externalists begin by noting 
the following.  What is imaginable is conceptually possible.  We can imagine an amoralist, 
therefore the amoralist must be conceptually possible.  Thus, internalism must be false and 
externalism must be true.
18
  This is not a good argument as every step of the reasoning process can 
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be questioned.  Internalists right away reject this argument since it goes against what they consider 
as a conceptual truth regarding moral judgments; that they necessarily motivate.  Furthermore, this 
does nothing to illuminate whether such a supposed amoralist is actually making a sincere moral 
judgment or not.  Internalists explain such an amoralist away by arguing that they do not make 
sincere moral judgments, but are rather simply using moral judgments in an ‘inverted commas’ 
sense.
19
  I come back to the inverted commas objection in chapter IV as I believe that addressing 
this objection plays a vital role in defending my view.  Either way, the use of the putative amoralist 
has aided externalists in their attempts to unseat internalism as an a priori constraint on meta-ethical 
theorizing.   
 
II. A Defense Against the Weak Internalist View 
 
2.1. Smith’s Cognitivist Internalist View 
 I started this thesis by citing Smith’s layout of ‘the moral problem’.  Smith’s personal meta-
ethical position can be summarized as being a combination of precisely the three views which he 
claimed cannot be held together without contradiction: (1) moral cognitivism, (2) motivational 
internalism, and (3) the Humean theory of motivation.  Nevertheless, Smith develops a 
sophisticated and comprehensive account throughout his book in order to resolve the inconsistency 
without having to reject any of the three positions and it is fair to say that his account has a great 
amount of appeal.  However, I certainly cannot recapitulate his overall account here as I do not have 
the space for it and it would not do justice to his view anyhow.  Instead, I focus on just the 
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internalist component of his overall view.  I start out by presenting Smith’s internalist view in its 
most basic form, the way it is offered by Smith himself: 
If an agent judges that it is right for her to  in circumstances C, then either she is 
motivated to  in C or she is practically irrational.
20
 
Smith calls this ‘the practicality requirement on moral judgment’ – or just ‘the practicality 
requirement’ for short – and asserts it as a conceptual truth.  Just from this claim, it is evident that 
Smith takes the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation to also be a 
defeasible one.  The necessary connection can be broken if an agent is ‘practically irrational’.  This 
might elicit criticism that Smith’s view is too weak and that it could collapse into externalism.  The 
reason Smith’s view is nonetheless an internalist one is due to what is entailed by his position 
regarding practical (ir)rationality.   
 Smith endorses a view he calls ‘rationalism as a conceptual claim’: “the claim that our 
concept of a moral requirement is the concept of a reason for action; a requirement of rationality or 
reason.”
21
  Following an analysis of normative reasons, Smith further argues that when an agent 
acknowledges a reason for action, she shows most rationality by being motivated to act upon that 
reason.  In other words, making a moral judgment is the result of deliberation about what it is 
morally desirable to do; and when we have a moral belief, we show most rationality if we have a 
desire to act upon it.  Therefore it follows that if an agent is rational and acknowledges a moral 
requirement (a reason for action) she ought to be motivated to act upon it.  Consider the following 
passage from Smith: 
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“It is a platitude that an agent has a reason to act in a certain way just in case she 
would be motivated to act in that way if she were rational… And it is a 
consequence of this platitude that an agent who judges herself to have a reason to 
act in a certain way – who judges that she would be so motivated if she were 
rational – is practically irrational if she is not motivated to act accordingly.  For if 
she is not motivated accordingly then she fails to be rational by her own lights.”
22
 
Smith equates ‘judges herself to have a reason to act in a certain way’ with ‘judges that she would 
be so motivated if she were rational’.  At first glance, these two ideas do not seem to be necessarily 
equivalent.  However, Smith makes this claim on reasons for action, or normative reasons, by 
providing the following explanation.  Smith observes that the examination into normative reasons 
must start with the odd fact that an agent’s deliberations on normative reason claims sometimes 
influences her actions, while sometimes they do not: “that accepting normative reasons claims can 
both be bound up with having desires and yet come apart from having desires.”
23
   
 So begin with the supposition that ‘believing that one has a normative reason x’ is 
equivalent to ‘valuing x’.
24
  The question would then be what is the relationship between ‘valuing’ 
and ‘desiring’ (where desiring here is understood as the motivational state)?  Often times these two 
concepts go hand in hand as, for example, people that value a good relationship with their parents 
also desire a good relationship with their parents.  However, they are not identical states as one can 
also value something but not desire it and desire something but not value it.  One can value exercise 
for good health without having a desire to actually exercise, as well as having a desire for cigarettes 
without valuing smoking.  With these considerations playing a major role in his analysis of valuing, 
Smith concludes that ‘valuing something’, or the mental state of valuing (that is, to accept that we 
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have a normative reason to do something), must be a belief-like cognitive state rather than a desire-
like non-cognitive state because no analysis of valuing as desiring can overcome the notion that we 
can also value something but not desire it.   
 Smith notes that a point which emerged from this analysis of valuing possibly as a form of 
desiring is that “though a rational agent desires… in accordance with the normative reason claims 
she accepts, an irrational agent may desire otherwise,”
25
 and he goes on to assert that this notion 
suggests that normative reasons are subject to the following constraint. 




Smith believes this to be an accurate depiction of the conceptual connection between our moral 
beliefs and desires and supports this view by noting that it is a platitude to say that for any agent, 
“what we have normative reason to do is what we would desire that we do if we were fully 
rational.”
27
  Smith believes this adheres to many of the platitudes regarding our conceptions of what 
is entailed by reasons for action and motivation.   
 Furthermore, throughout his book Smith mentions weakness of will, apathy, accidie and the 
like as paradigm cases of practical irrationality.
28
  Regarding these forms of practical irrationality, 
with phenomena such as weakness of will and apathy, the agent seems to be in some sense 
‘willingly’ going against her better judgment.  That is, for Smith, the reason we can consider such 
phenomena as paradigm cases of practical irrationality is because the psychology of such an agent 
who is not motivated to pursue the content of her own genuine moral judgment clearly exhibits an 
incoherence in that she fails to desire (and so act upon) those very things she herself judges to be 
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the right or morally required thing to do, and where there is no ‘external’
29
 interference to stop the 
agent from desiring accordingly. 
 Now contrast these cases to another type which Smith would also label as cases of 
irrationality – the agent who cannot be motivated to pursue her moral convictions either due to 
neurological damage or some form of a pathological condition.  Unlike the previously mentioned 
phenomena of weakness of will or apathy – where the agent is in some sense willingly going 
against her better judgment – in the cases of neurological damage or having some sort of 
pathological condition, even Smith would grant that the agent here is not willingly failing to 
endorse the moral demands she has acknowledged in the same sense.  Nevertheless, Smith would 
regard them as irrational in the sense that “the psychological processes of the perfectly rational 
agent are subject to no such interference.”
30
  Therefore, for Smith, it is true that a rational agent 
must desire in accordance with the normative reasons she believes she has, and any case where that 
is not so should rightfully be labeled as a case of practical irrationality. 
 Going further into Smith’s internalist view, I mentioned that Smith also defends moral 
cognitivism.
31
  This implies that he has a certain etiology in mind regarding the nature of the 
conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation as well as a specific notion 
regarding what it means to judge that -ing is right and why therefore it is practically irrational to 
not be motivated thereafter.  So if we were to reformulate Smith’s internalist claim in a more 
comprehensive manner, it might look something like the following: 
Necessarily, if an agent judges that it is right for her to  in circumstances C and is 
motivated to  in C, then it is the content of the agent’s judgment that -ing is 
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right in C itself that generates the motivation to  in C; and if the agent fails to be 
motivated by her judgment that -ing is right in C, then she is practically irrational, 
because to judge that -ing is right in C is to judge that there is a reason to  in C. 
This schema captures all the major elements in Smith’s internalist view: from cognitivism, to his 
modal claim, to his claim regarding the etiology of motivation, and to his thesis regarding practical 
rationality.
32
  To summarize then, the reason Smith is an internalist, and the reason he supports 
some variation of the inverted commas objection, is because for Smith having a moral judgment is 
coming to the belief that it would be desirable to do that which is morally required.  This is simply a 
matter of deliberating upon what it is that we are rationally justified in doing.  Therefore, we are 
rational insofar as we endorse the moral judgment; and inversely, we demonstrate incoherence by 
neglecting the normative content of our moral judgments.  So as far as rational agents are concerned, 
internalism is correct. 
 One final element that is worth mentioning about Smith’s internalist view is his depiction of 
the ‘good and strong-willed person’.  In good and strong-willed persons, believing that doing  is 
right, results in a desire (and thus motivation) to .  The amoralist who is unmotivated by her 
sincere moral judgment deserves rational criticism because she fails to reflect a good and strong-
willed person.
33
  What does this rational criticism amount to?  Part of the answer, I believe, is 
reflected in Smith’s variation of the inverted commas objection against externalism.  I discuss 
Smith’s version of the inverted commas objection in chapter IV.  In the rest of this chapter, I look to 
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defend externalism against the internalist claims laid out by Smith before I present my positive 
account of the (contingent) relationship between moral judgment and motivation. 
 
2.2. On the Relationship Between Rationality and Motivation 
 R. Jay Wallace states that the interaction between (normative) reasons and motivation is 
such that reasons on their own do not have some ‘magically intrinsic’ motivational power to them, 
but rather that a further argument must be given.  He cites the example that contributing to one’s 
pension fund in order to enhance financial security in old age is, in itself, merely an interesting fact 
about that course of action, but that it is perfectly possible for a rational agent to acknowledge that 
this fact obtains and still lack any motivation.
34
  Wallace further asserts that the term ‘irrationality’ 
is best reserved to “refer to cases in which people fail to act and think in accordance with the 
normative judgment about their reasons that they themselves endorse.”
35
   
 But it seems entirely possible that people can fail to endorse the normative content of their 
reasons, let alone the fact that people can fail to act accordingly.  For when an agent acknowledges 
that it is morally right to φ, it seems this acknowledgment is another way of saying that, from a 
moral perspective, she has a reason to φ.  But this does not mean that if the agent is rational, she is 
therefore necessarily acknowledging from a more practical commitment-to-action sense, that she 
has a reason to φ.  That is, it seems fully plausible that rational agents sometimes do not take their 
commitments as far as actually carrying out the action at stake, even on the basis of the (necessary) 
moral acknowledgment.  Of course in many agents, not just those who we call virtuous, their moral 
perspectives will align with their practical side so as to affect their daily practical lives in a direct 
sense.  However, it is not a logical conclusion that these two viewpoints will necessarily match in 
every (rational) agent.   
                                                          
34





 Furthermore, even if accepting a normative reason to φ is equivalent to accepting that it 
would be desirable to φ, it does not necessarily follow that, if an agent is rational, she will be 
motivated by that which she has acknowledged as desirable to do.  We can see this from a non-
moral perspective.  If a person made the judgment that it would be desirable to run a marathon (or 
rob a bank), this does not mean, were she a rational agent, that she is therefore necessarily 
motivated to run a marathon (or rob a bank).  Thus I do not think that we have reason to accept 
Smith’s claim that ‘a rational agent desires… in accordance with the normative reason claims she 
accepts’, nor that such acknowledgment will necessarily lead to motivation.  
Consider the following passage by Gary Watson: 
Notice that, when things go as intended, practical deliberation involves making up 
my mind twice.  Making up my mind about what is best to do is coming to a 
judgment: deciding that such and such is the thing to do.  Making up my mind 
about what to do is forming an intention: deciding to do such and such… Although 
they typically coincide, these are importantly distinct forms of commitment.  The 
distinction manifests itself in at least two familiar ways: first, when we fail to reach 
a decision about what is best to do because the reasons are unclear or indeterminate 
but we still must decide to do x or to do y; and, secondly, when we fail to follow 
our decision about what is best.
36
  
There is correlation between this passage and Smith’s cognitivist account in that Smith accepts that 
moral judgments are practical judgments in the sense that they involve practical deliberation.  
However, notice that in the passage, Watson asserts that an agent can ‘fail to follow [on her] 
decision about what is best’.  This claim, I believe, is not controversial because Watson makes a 
distinction which I do not think Smith makes.  Watson makes a distinction within practical 
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judgments as it relates to motivation in that there are some types that are not related to motivation 
while others are.  More specifically, judgments about what ought to be done in (moral) situations 
are not the same as ‘making up my mind about what to do… forming an intention’.  It is the latter 
that has an intrinsic connection to motivation, whereas the former necessarily does not.  As Elinor 
Mason put it, “There is an internal connection between motivation and ‘judgement’… if by 
judgement we mean something like decision or intention: Watson’s second sense.  However there is 
no internal connection between thinking an act best and motivation.”
37
 
 Mason further elaborates that this distinction can be understood as being the difference 
between seeing the appropriate means to one’s ends, versus pursuing the best means to one’s ends
38
; 
where ‘pursuing’ of course does not imply that action necessarily has to follow, but is rather 
forming an intention towards whatever aims have been concluded from the deliberative processes 
that have taken place.  I believe that Smith’s view trades-off on the ambiguity between the two 
forms.  But following the distinction explained by Watson and Mason, charging an agent as 
practically irrational for failing to be motivated due to not being able to grasp, or see, the 
appropriate means is not an indictment against the agent’s motivational sensitivity, but rather a 
charge of a lack of moral sensibility.  If this were the charge, it would make (weak) motivational 
internalism entirely trivial: for “the defeasibility of motivation must not undermine the claim that 
there is a necessary connection between [moral] belief and motivation.”
39
  The charge of practical 
irrationality must indicate some other type of fault in the unmotivated agent, reflective of a more 
general impairment than simply having committed some error of ‘moral badness or moral 
weakness’.   
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 I believe that Philippa Foot was arguing along these lines in her paper, Morality as a System 
of Hypothetical Imperatives.
40
  As Foot notes, a rational amoralist who is not motivated by her 
moral judgment can only be considered as acting wrong in a moral sense, not in a rational sense. 
The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its 
rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.  Nor will his action 
necessarily be irrational.  Irrational actions are those in which a man in some way 
defeats his own purposes, doing what is calculated to be disadvantageous or to 
frustrate his ends.  Immorality does not necessarily involve any such thing.
41
 
For Foot, practical irrationality involves ‘defeating one’s own purposes’ and ‘frustrating one’s ends’.  
In other words, practical rationality is a prudential notion that centers on an agent’s self-interests.  
Foot herself eventually ends up renouncing this view, calling it a ‘bad mistake’.
42
  However, I 
believe the core idea of her view is still relevantly insightful and can be prompted as a prominent 
argument with a little supplementation.  For the strength of Foot’s argument does not rely upon 
whether it is as a matter of fact truly the case that practical rationality involves a strictly prudential 
(or even just an agent-centered, as opposed to other-regarding) conception.  Rather, it simply 
requires possible conceptions of practical reason that might not align with morality in the sense that 
it is possible to imagine that moral requirements might not have absolute rational authority; or as 
David Brink put it, “questioning the rational authority of moral reasons.”
43
  That is, as long as there 
are such possibilities, with Foot’s claim exemplifying the groundworks, then it seems that we must 
at the very least recognize the possibility that the rational authority of morality should be treated as 
an open question.   
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 Note that there seems to be a sense in which the statement ‘there is always a reason to do as 
morality demands’ is a conceptual truth that everyone accepts.  This is not a rebuttal to the 
arguments laid out so far, as that statement simply understands every moral obligation as entailing a 
moral reason, just like every legal obligation providing a legal reason, or every obligation of 
etiquette entailing an etiquette reason.  Therefore, even if the internalist says that the moral reason 
provided by the moral obligation (in this sense) supplies the answer to those who question the 
grounds of obedience, this is not the kind of answer that would satisfy a rational amoralist’s query 
into practical (moral) reasons.  For such an agent could question what justification there is to follow 
those moral reasons; and then what justification there is to follow the reasons offered for following 
the aforementioned reasons, and so on ad infinitum.
44
  Or as Wallace additionally considers, perhaps 
she might even simply accept the truth of moral claims without accepting that they apply to her (or 
any agent for that matter) in any normatively significant sense.
45
   
 The key point is that what matters is what beliefs an agent could hold, not whether those 
beliefs are true or not.  If an agent could hold conceptions of practical reason that might not align 
with morality in the sense that moral requirements might not have absolute rational authority, 
perhaps due to certain beliefs about morality and rationality that diverge, then it is conceivable that 
such moments of doubt (even if they hypothetically rest on substantive mistakes regarding the 
rational authority of morality) could lead to failure in motivation from her moral judgments.  Of 
course, it would be much less problematic if the demands of morality and that of practical 
rationality always align.  But undoubtedly an agent can, at the very least, perceive that the demands 
of morality and practical rationality do not always converge.  So even if her lack of motivation is 
due to a mistaken conception of morality or rationality, the (principled) amoralist is conceivable.   
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2.3. The Externalist Claim 
 A way to understand the externalist claim is that the connection between moral judgment 
and motivation is contingent on: (i) a person’s psychological make-up and (ii) on the perceived 
content of moral demands.
46
  To say that the connection between moral judgment and motivation is 
contingent on a person’s psychological make-up is to mean that there could be agents whose 
possession of certain mental conditions (such as depression, apathy, lethargy, etc.) or certain events 
in an agent’s life that could alter her disposition (perhaps due to psychological trauma experienced 
by the agent during the event) can lead to a disconnect between moral judgment and motivation.  
However, this claim only seems to affect strong forms of internalism; as weaker versions can 
accommodate this claim by providing an understanding of the concept of a ‘rational agent’ as 
excluding these types of instances, in addition to false beliefs or improper reasoning, as forms of 
irrationality.  Since the view that needs to be dealt with in this thesis is the weak internalist view, 
this sort of claim for externalism would therefore not be a very successful one.   
 The externalist claim that the connection between moral judgment and motivation is 
contingent on the agent’s perceived content of moral demands includes at least two possible reasons 
for why there could be a disconnect.  The first possibility would be that the agent perceives the 
content of the moral demand to be so impossible to achieve, so overly demanding, or so out of 
touch with perceived reality, that she cannot find herself motivated to follow it.  That it would either 
be futile or practically irrational, in her mind, to even attempt to follow it; and this apparent sense of 
futility, impracticality or irrationality could then conceivably strip an agent of motivation.  To 
elaborate on this, consider when an agent makes a moral judgment in which she believes that  is 
right but also that the goal of  is impossible to achieve.  This seems to be conceptually possible, 
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especially since there are certain normative ethical views
47
 which have been criticized to be so 
demanding that in certain cases – perhaps because there are certain conditions that just cannot be 
met or certain circumstances that provide to be too great of an obstacle to the agent – they just do 
not seem to be satisfiable.  In this type of situation, it seems conceivable that a feeling of futility 
which accompanies the moral judgment might stifle any sort of motivation that could or should 
have come with the moral judgment.   
 One important point to note though is that this argument only works if the agent does not 
disavow the value of the normativity that is contained in the moral content due to the impossibility 
(perceived or otherwise) of following the moral demand.  In other words, there is the objection that 
this example faces the ought-implies-can edict; or more specifically speaking, the edict that what is 
impossible cannot be a moral obligation.  However, whether that view is correct or not, what 
matters is how an agent perceives the moral demand in the judgment.  As far as that is concerned, it 
seems entirely possible that an agent either does not consider such an ought-implies-can edict or 
personally holds a rejection of such a view.   
 The internalist here might respond that ‘thinking  to be obligatory yet impossible at the 
same time’ – that is, implicitly rejecting the ought-implies-can edict – is simply a matter of 
irrationality.  That one cannot rationally think she is morally obligated to do that which she finds 
impossible to do.  But far from being the case that the ought-implies-can debate has been resolved, 
it would seem to me that arguing for irrationality based on the rejection of this deontic principle is 
basically presupposing a connection between rationality and ethics that needs to be argued for 
separately.  Furthermore, even if one provides a valid conceptual argument for the connection, it is 
another thing entirely to thus conclude that the psychology of all moral agents fits neatly according 
to such a conceptual standard of rationality.  For when the point regarding some agents seemingly 
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rejecting the ought-implies-can edict is elaborated on, it is that their rejection of this view is not 
based on some clear conceptual foundation, but because their psychology is such that their implicit 
rejection of this view can be seen empirically by their judgments or actions.  Let me provide a non-
moral case as an example to support this view. 
 Imagine as a high school senior your parents implore you to apply to Harvard and Yale and 
you know that applying to such Ivy League schools is a worthy endeavor even if your parents did 
not make this request.  However, you also know for certain that your grades and resume are just not 
good enough to get you in and that your parents just have an unreasonably rosy perception of your 
academics.  Thus you feel that spending the time to apply to the two schools would just be a huge 
waste of time, followed by the obvious disappointment of the rejection letters.  Nonetheless, your 
valuation of the worth of what it means to earn a degree from those schools is not changed.  In this 
case, the general consensus seems to be that a sincere prediction of futility will ensure that no 
motivation follows even while you maintain the value of the non-moral demand.
48
  If so, and if 
many already accept that this is a perfectly plausible explanation for the failure of motivation to 
arise, then there needs to be a separate explanation regarding what is markedly different between 
moral and non-moral cases.   
 A second way to elaborate upon why an agent might perceive it irrational to follow a 
particular moral edict is if moral and prudential demands conflict and so the agent, in perfect 
cognition, readily dismisses the moral demand – perhaps the thought of giving up on the prudential 
demand causes too much fear, worry, concern, etc.  This is based off a classic externalist notion that 
sometimes moral obligations can conflict with certain demands of prudence or self-interested 
desires.  Regarding such a scenario I want to list out a few possible variances.  First, the moral 
demand seems particularly inconsequential.  Perhaps she thinks it is a moral demand that will do 
                                                          
48
 Of course if the agent still filled out the applications, the motivation behind such action can be explained 
by a desire to please one’s parents or being motivated by a sense of hope, for example.   
30 
 
absolutely no harm if not followed, or if not followed on just this one occasion.  Second, the 
prudential consideration is of a particularly invaluable or indispensable sort; one which, if had to be 
sacrificed, would take a great toll or cost on the agent.  In another sense, perhaps forfeiting the 
prudential consideration, in order to follow the demands of the moral obligation, might just be too 
dreadful – it might cause great fear or anxiety in the agent if having to be sacrificed.  When the 
ratios are on such opposite extremes of the spectrum, it seems that the agent might not just be past 
the point of wavering, but too gripped with fear or anxiety (or greed in the case of incurring a cost) 
that she is just unable to be motivated to follow the moral demand.   
 What is important here as well is that the agent still understands that the moral demand is a 
genuine reason.  It is arguable that emotional elements such as fear or anxiety could momentarily 
‘blind’ the agent, so to speak, so as to allow for a charge of irrationality.  But I think it is entirely 
possible for an agent who is filled with fear to nonetheless maintain complete control over her 
cognitive faculties insofar as judging what is at stake; as this is reflected by an agent’s feeling of 
guilt or cowardice towards her own lack of motivation or inability to act upon her moral judgment.  
The fact of the matter is we often acknowledge normative reasons that are not necessarily in line 
with what we endeavor or want to do.  Therefore, even if we think we have to do it, if the reason for 
doing it does not seem particularly appealing to us, why would it not be conceivable for us to lack 
the motivation to do it? 
 For instance, I acknowledge the normative significance of legal considerations, but I may 
fail to be motivated by a certain one simply because I do not hold the normativity of that legal 
consideration to sufficiently outweigh conflicting reasons or potential costs.  Take the example of a 
fairly recent law enacted in South Korea that makes it illegal for private teaching institutions 
(known as ‘hagwons’) to be open later than 11 p.m. and let’s suppose that I am a Korean parent in 
South Korea.  I may, for instance, believe that although I cannot dispute any fine levied unto me if I 
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were to transgress because I do acknowledge the normative authority of the law, nonetheless I could 
have a certain view on education and child rearing that inclines me to send my child to study at such 
an institution past the allotted time if that academy is willing to protect my child from any legal 
dangers and so forth.  Perhaps this reveals my limits as a law-abiding citizen, but does it indicate a 
failure in rationality if I am not motivated appropriately from my acknowledgment that this law is 
normatively significant?  I find it to be far from obvious that this is the case. 
 The internalist could argue whether the example is applicable – that the domain of laws and 
that of morality are sufficiently distinct so that this example is inapplicable.  That perhaps the 
normativity entailed from legal requirements is somehow weaker, or at least different, than that of 
moral requirements.  However, I think there is good reason to consider the arguments of this 
example as applicable since the basic structure of the normativity of legal considerations – that it 
applies to everyone involved and that it makes no exceptions based on an agent’s preferences or 
desires – seem to be no different from that of the normativity of moral considerations.  Wallace, 
who is an internalist himself, concedes that “it is not irrational to fail to be motivated to act on 
reasons that one acknowledges if those reasons are either defeated themselves, or such as to render 
an action one of a plurality of eligible or valuable options for choice,”
49
 and further adds that “it 
would be implausibly strict.. requiring that agents should have an occurrent desire for every 
normative reason they acknowledge to obtain… Rational agents will be motivated to act on the 
reasons they acknowledge to obtain, so long as they do not take those reasons to be defeated by 
other normative considerations, and so long as they have not resolved to pursue other eligible 
options.”
50
  But even most internalists (at least the ones which comprise the target of my thesis) 
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concede that moral reasons are not “always so compelling that they defeat whatever reasons might 




2.4. Action-Guiding Not the Same as Motivating 
 As a final point in concluding my arguments against Smith’s internalist contention, I think 
we have little reason to accept the assertion of a necessary connection between moral judgment and 
motivation because I believe what drives the internalist sentiment is actually a conflation between 
what it means for something to be normative and for that thing to be motivating.  Wallace argues 
that part of the conception of moral judgments as being normative entails that such 
acknowledgment by an agent has to be followed by motivation.  This is necessary in order to show 
that “those who are morally motivated are somehow responding appropriately or correctly to the 
moral distinctions they grasp.”
52
  However, far from being an obvious truth that there is such a 
motivation-entailing normative requirement (as externalists deny that there is such a dimension to 
capture
53
), I think that Wallace’s claim is an example of precisely this conflation, and so I look to 
explain my concern against internalism by arguing against a direct and necessary connection 
between the normativity of morality and moral motivation. 
 First let me loosely define something being normative as making a claim on how something 
‘ought’ to be, whether something is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or whether some action is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.  
Needless to say then, moral judgments, the content of which generally contain terms such as ‘ought’, 
‘good’ or ‘right’ are obviously normative in nature.  However, as far as moral judgments relating to 
motivation goes, it is important to note that it is not the normative fact simpliciter, but rather the 
effect of the normative force of these facts on the agent making the judgment, that determines 
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whether she is motivated from her moral belief or not.  Whether or not this is obvious, there seems 
to be a general conflation of these ideas.  The fact of the matter is, normative content (or what I 
referred to as the normative fact) is strictly reflective of the ‘action-guidingness’ of morality.  
Furthermore, because this action-guidingness of morality does not have a connection to motivation, 
it is thus a misattribution to say that the normative nature of moral judgments suggests an 
entailment of motivation.  That is, action-guidingness in morality is a distinct characteristic of 
morality that is outside the purview of the psychological domain that involves motivation.   
 The primary indication of a conflation comes from the widely accepted view that morality, 
in general, is supposed to be ‘practical’ or ‘action-guiding’ in an intrinsic sense.  For instance, a 
moral principle that cannot show us what to do is often regarded as either not being a real moral 
principle, or trivial in the sense of being incapable of serving as a moral principle.  Thus, the term 
‘action-guiding’ in meta-ethics is commonly referred to as a natural characteristic inherent to 
morality in general.  Brink explains this idea using the relation of the concepts ‘action-guiding’ and 
‘practical’.  
It has seemed to many people that moral considerations are practical in some very 
important sense.  Agents engage in moral deliberation in order to decide what to do 
and give moral advice with the aim of influencing others’ conduct in certain ways.  
We regard moral considerations as important practical considerations.  We expect 
people who accept moral claims to make moral judgments to act in certain ways.
54
 
This kind of perception naturally lends favor to the internalist understanding of the relationship 
between moral judgment and motivation, as noted by Smith. 
[M]oral judgments seem to be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we have for 
behaving in certain ways, and, other things being equal, having such opinions is a 
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matter of finding ourselves with a corresponding motivation to act.  Let’s call this 
the ‘practicality of moral judgment’.
55
  
However, the basic action-guiding conception of moral judgments as guides to conduct should not 
be construed as an argument for motivational internalism.  That is because to say that someone has 
a moral obligation (that there is action-guidingness in the moral considerations) is not the same as 
saying that someone feels or is moved by the moral obligation.  In other words, to say that someone 
has a moral obligation does not necessarily mean that an agent will be motivated to act as such just 
from that notion itself.  Understanding a moral principle as a guide to conduct and an agent being 
motivated by the comprehension of that moral principle are two separate notions, so that even if we 
take it as a conceptual truth that moral judgments purport to guide action, that does not entail that 
they necessarily succeed in doing so.  
 Sigrun Svavarsdóttir provides two arguments for differentiating the realms of action-
guidingness and motivation.  For the first argument, she asks what it is to understand a piece of 
language as expressing a prescription, guidelines or directive.
56
  She rejects any possible conclusion 
along the lines of such an understanding necessarily entailing motivation to undertake the 
prescribed action.  She offers the following non-moral example for why simply understanding a 
moral idea fails to motivate, “I can understand a recipe [of how to broil salted cod] and pass it on to 
others without having any inclination to follow it.”  She next puts forth for consideration whether a 
stronger discernment of accepting a moral idea would be a kind of manifestation of motivation to 
follow its directions.  She is quick to also deny such as being the case as she notes that she can both 
“accept the recipe as a guide to broiling salted cod, yet not be at all inclined to broil salted cod,” 
hence not engaging in the project at all, or “accept the recipe as a guide to broiling salted cod and 
broil salted cod without being in the least motivated to follow the recipe” even if she finds nothing 
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wrong with the recipe itself but just simply because she may wish to do things differently from the 
way the recipe prescribes.  “In other words, it is possible to engage in a project and accept 
something as a guide – even a good guide – to such a project, yet not be moved to follows its 
directions.”
57
  What this means is that while adequate understanding of a moral judgment requires, 
at minimum, that the agent accepts that it is a moral guide to action (or living, on a broader 
interpretation), an adequate understanding of a moral judgment does not require motivation to 
follow.
 58
   
 Svavarsdóttir’s second argument adds that any internalist defense for such a connection 
between the normative nature of moral guidelines and moral motivation is conceptually confused.  
For as she notes, “this defense relies on an implausible understanding of the claim that moral 
judgments are guides to action: the directional role essential to moral judgment cannot be reduced 
to a motivational role.”
59
  In order to better understand what Svavarsdóttir is meaning here, consider 
the following idea.  Take the moral principle ‘do not harass others’.  If a person felt no motivation 
towards that principle and were to ignore her own moral judgment (to not harass others) and acts 
contrary to it instead, the ‘action-guidingness’ of that moral judgment does not disappear or get 
diminished in any sense due to the agent’s actual motivations or actions.  Rather, the judgment is 
action-guiding nonetheless in the sense that it maintains a guideline which the person happened to 
ignore or transgress.   




 There is, however, an important disanalogy between the examples provided by Svavarsdóttir of guidelines 
for cooking to guidelines provided by moral judgments.  It is of course that the latter are inescapable in that 
they are not dependent on the agent.  However, it is important to note that this inescapability once again 
refers to the normative aspect – the action-guiding practicality of morality – not the psychological aspect of 
motivation.  The guidelines of the cooking recipe are not binding on me to follow unless I wish to do so 
intentionally or have committed myself to do so otherwise.  Therefore, I make no mistake in acting contrary 
to the cooking guidelines.  Moral judgments do make such a normative claim regardless of whether I wish to 
follow it or not.  However, as I have argued already regarding the conflation of normativity and motivation, 
the normative inescapability of moral judgments cannot be explained in terms of their actual or hypothetical 
motivational role. 
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 Furthermore, if moral motivation were to have a direct link to the action-guidingness of 
moral judgments – where, for example, “the claim that a judgment guides conduct is that it 
motivates the agent to act in one way rather than another”
60
 – then the decisiveness of any particular 
moral guideline would vary from case to case depending on the motivational impact of the 
judgment on the individual involved.  However, that would seem plainly absurd.  It is possible to 
consider the ‘weight’ of any given action-guiding prescription of a moral judgment to vary against 
competing moral prescriptions (a la W.D. Ross’ ‘prima facie duties’
61
) but it seems like a strange 
ethical theory to say that the weight of such prescriptions can vary depending on how much an 
agent is motivated by it.  If these arguments seem plausible, I think we have good reason to be wary 
of the internalist assertion of a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation as a 
conceptual truth. 
 
III. The Source of Moral Motivation 
 
3.1. Non-Humean Externalism 
 In the introductory section I stated that my position should be understood as taking an 
externalist stance, whereby rejecting Smith’s assumption two (motivational internalism).  I further 
noted that, as an additional consequence to what my position amounts to, I reject assumption three 
(the Humean theory of motivation) as well.  My rejection of these two views is another way of 
saying that I argue for the following two claims:  
4. That moral motivation is not a necessary entailment from moral judgment, and;  
5. That moral motivation does not involve a basic, underived desire-like non-cognitive state.   
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In order to support the aforementioned claims, I argue for a position that I believe is hardly popular 
in this field.  This is because the two claims, (4) motivational externalism and (5) non-Humeanism, 
seem to conflict with each other.  Of course it is not uncommon to accept one or the other position 
and there are many philosophers who do so, but there do not seem to be many who accept both 
positions simultaneously.  Let me briefly explain why someone might think holding both of these 
positions together might be conflicting and then I will follow with an explanation of why this is not 
the case. 
  First of all, claim (5) (the claim for the falsity of Humeanism), in conjunction with 
cognitivism, not only implies that moral judgments are to be understood as representing some type 
of belief-like cognitive state, but also argues for the possibility of a belief-like state being sufficient 
to motivate.  As I am looking to assert in support of this claim then, moral beliefs alone are capable 
of motivating, thus are sufficient, if they motivate those who make corresponding moral judgments 
without having any antecedent desire-like state.  However, if this is so, then it would seem that 
moral judgments, as beliefs, have to be necessarily motivating.  Of course a sufficient condition 
does not imply a necessary condition, but the claim that moral judgments motivate seems to be the 
same as saying that moral judgments entail motivation, which would then seem to essentially be a 
reflection of the internalist view.  That is, unlike the externalist that posits an external source as the 
cause for moral motivation, the internalist argues that moral motivation is essentially entailed from 
moral judgment.  I believe this idea, although mistaken, is on the right path.  However, internalism 
would then be contrary to my initial claim of externalism.  So I offer the following explanation for 
how these two claims can be held simultaneously. 
 Moral judgment internalism is loosely understood as that moral judgment is necessarily 
motivating.  From this, it seems unproblematic to say that moral motivation is intrinsic to moral 
judgment.  I reject the former and accept the latter.  If we consider internalism to have multiple 
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facets, we can define these two points distinctively.
62
  (i) The first can be understood as being 
internalism’s modal claim.  It is by virtue of either being a conceptual or empirical necessity that 
moral judgments necessarily motivate.  (ii) The second facet can be understood as being 
internalism’s etiological claim of motivation.  This is a claim regarding the nature of the connection 
that holds between moral judgments and motivation (which is used to provide an explanation for 
how moral judgments cause motivation).  Cognitivists and non-cognitivists have decidedly differing 
explanations regarding the nature of the connection which I discuss in more detail towards the latter 
half of this section.  For now, when considering the two facets here (in addition to the fact that I am 
more sympathetic to the externalist view), I believe that the necessary (modal) connection is the 
crucial element depicting internalism.  Therefore insofar as rejecting the necessary connection, I 
take my view to be externalist.
63
   
 By rejecting the Humean theory of motivation and asserting that moral judgments are 
simply expressions of an agent’s beliefs, my view can be understood as that moral beliefs are the 
mental states responsible for moral motivation and that such motivation is intrinsic to that very 
moral judgment.  But as I contend, a moral belief may be intrinsically motivating without being 
necessarily motivating.  Since I assert that internalism (of the cognitive variety) is a view foremost 
regarding a necessary connection between moral beliefs and motivation, I do not believe that it is 
contradictory to hold the position I am trying to defend.
64
  We can see this point more clearly with 
the following two statements: 
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6. All moral judgments motivate agents that make or hold such judgments.  Thus moral 
judgments necessarily motivate at all times. 
7. When moral judgments motivate it is necessarily due to something internal to the moral 
judgment. 
Statement (6) does not explicitly state anything descriptive regarding the source of motivation, but 
simply states the fact that there is a consistent and necessary connection between moral judgment 
and motivation.  Therefore, this statement is neutral regarding cognitivism/non-cognitivism or 
Humeanism/non-Humeanism.  It could be the case that the necessary connection between moral 
judgments and motivation is due to the fact that moral judgments simply are expressions of one’s 
conative state.  It could also be the case that moral judgments are actually fact-stating but that 
desires are still always involved in some sense which leads to the motivation.  The possibility that 
moral judgments are purely belief-like states that somehow motivate is also available. 
 Statement (7) explicitly makes a reference to the source of motivation by asserting that the 
motivation that follows a moral judgment is due to something internal or intrinsic to the moral 
judgment.  While the statement is vague as to the precise description of the source that composes a 
moral judgment, the idea is that motivation occurs in virtue of the very nature or content of the 
moral judgment.  We can consider some common views that reflect this position: such as the 
agent’s acknowledgment of the normative significance of the moral considerations being sufficient 
to motivate; or that such acknowledgment generates the relative desire-like state needed for 
motivation; or something along the lines of describing the psychological structure of an agent as 
being influenced by what is pertained in the semantic content of the moral judgment once the agent 
gains cognitive access to it.  However, (7) is quiet on the degree of efficacy of motivation from 
moral judgments.  As I have stated above, I consider statement (6) to be the depiction of 
motivational internalism proper. 
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 There might, nevertheless, be an objection that statement (7) would seem to entail that 
every time a moral judgment is made, motivation would follow.  It would seem that if motivation is 
intrinsic to moral judgment, it would be the case that necessarily motivation has to be entailed from 
a moral judgment.  I think this misses the point of the distinction I have tried to make and brings us 
to the explanation of internalism’s etiological claim of motivation.  When we say ‘motivation is 
entailed from a moral judgment’ what is important is how we interpret the concept ‘entailed’ with 
respect to an account of the etiology of moral motivation.  On the one hand, entailed could mean 
that motivation is built into the moral judgment.  We can call this a constitutional claim – that 
motivation is somehow part of the constitution of a moral judgment.  Non-cognitivists would 
maintain this claim and assert something along the lines of ‘a moral judgment that -ing is right is 
identical to the agent’s motivation to ’.  On the other hand, entailed could mean that motivation 
comes into existence (even to the slightest degree) whenever a moral judgment is made by an agent.  
This way of understanding entailment is that motivation is generated from one or more elements 
that compose a moral judgment but is not a constitutive part of the moral judgment itself.  This 
understanding generally reflects the cognitivist’s account that ‘the propositional content of a moral 
judgment that -ing is right gives rise to or produces the motivation to ’.
65
  For lack of a better 
term, let me call this a causational claim.   
 Now part of what it means to take my position is to be working under the view that the 
entailment of motivation is a causational claim, not a constitutional one.  While this should be 
apparent since I accept cognitivism regarding moral judgments, this can also be shown from both 
the externalist and non-Humean perspective.  For under externalism, any argument for the 
plausibility of an amoralist would only work as long as motivation is not built into the moral 
judgment.  Since if motivation was built in as part of the structure of a moral judgment, it would 
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then be impossible for an agent that makes a moral judgment to fail to be motivated.  But 
externalism is precisely the view that argues for such a possibility of failure to be motivated from a 
moral judgment.  The same type of reasoning applies when considered from a non-Humean 
perspective.  As mentioned, the non-Humean view can be understood as that an agent’s moral 
beliefs sometimes generating some derived mental state (alike that of a desire) which is then what 
accounts for motivation.  As the derived mental state is not a necessary feature of what makes a 
moral judgment – since under the non-Humean model, the moral judgment is some form of moral 
belief – the only logical way to understand the motivation entailment under this view is as a 
causational claim, rather than the constitutional one.  Understood in this manner then, it seems 
clearly possible that, even though the source of moral motivation is internal to the moral judgment, 
there are a few ways to dissolve the necessary connection between them.   
 Russ Shafer-Landau offers one such way by suggesting the possibility of motivational 
defeaters extinguishing the motivation that would have come about from the moral judgment.
66
  The 
addition of motivational defeaters provides an account for instances when such intrinsically 
motivating beliefs fail to exert motivation.  Motivational defeaters can be competing beliefs, desires, 
or even non-mental factors such as physical duress or exhaustion, which influence the agent by 
severing the connection between moral judgment and motivation.  Shafer-Landau offers up two 
ways we can understand the notion of motivational defeaters, depending on whether it is the case 
that any relevant possible motivation from a moral judgment is completely distinguished or simply 
subdued when an agent lacks feeling motivation from her moral judgment. 
 What he calls ‘motivation pro tanto’ is motivation that, when overridden by competing 
factors, nevertheless remain as remnants or even in such a small degree that it might not be readily 
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  Still, even if it were causally inefficacious, the motivation is not completely dissipated 
and this is enough to support certain weaker versions of internalism.  The idea would be that when 
intrinsic motivation is understood as pro tanto, then any moral judgment that exerts motivation will 
always exert motivation no matter how small in degree.  So, moral judgments that are intrinsically 
motivating will also be necessarily motivating.   
 Alternatively, Shafer-Landau calls the second variation ‘motivation prima facie’.
68
  
Motivation of this kind, when affected by defeaters, is completely extinguished rather than 
remaining as remnants.  Since any possible motivation that might have come out of a moral 
judgment is completely non-existent, it is correct to say that there was no necessary motivation 
entailed from the moral judgment.  Understanding motivational defeaters in this manner is one 
method the intrinsic but not necessary externalist view I am advocating can be shown as plausible.   
 However, I do not prefer to rely on this distinction between motivation pro tanto and prima 
facie to support my view because the utilization of motivational defeaters to show a possible 
disconnect seems to infer an all things considered much stronger connection between moral 
judgment and motivation than what I have in mind.  That is, if motivational defeaters play the 
essential role in breaking up the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, 
then it would seem that, were there no such ‘hindrances’, an agent would necessarily be motivated 
after every moral judgment she makes.  However, this then opens up the possibility that this version 
of externalism is not much different from particularly weak forms of internalism, and I wish to 
avoid the possibility of such a conclusion.  Under the picture I look to draw, although moral 
motivation has its source within moral judgment, it is not necessarily part of the nature of a moral 
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judgment to be motivating to an agent who acknowledges its normative significance.  Thus, what I 
believe to be a more appealing view is that perhaps there is some further step required between that 
source and motivation for the agent to be motivated by her moral judgment.  In the remaining parts 
of this chapter then, I look to provide an explanation of this ‘further step’ that seems to be needed 
between moral judgment and motivation which can adequately demonstrate an intrinsic yet 
contingent connection. 
 
3.2. A Starting Distinction Between Two Types of Moral Judgments 
 The position I am advocating is that although moral judgments are responsible for 
motivation, it is not the case that moral judgments necessarily motivate.
69
  This naturally favors a 
cognitivist reading of moral judgments, since if moral judgments were composed of some desire-
like non-cognitive state, it would be difficult to see how they do not necessarily motivate.  I take 
this as the starting point of my positive account and look to explicate upon this view.  I begin from 
the cognitivist premise that moral judgments purport to be descriptive in the sense of aiming to 
portray some aspect of the world as being true.  If moral judgments purport to be descriptive of 
some moral facts of the world, then one of the consequences of making a moral judgment must be 
providing an account or description of some objective idea.   
 Recall the quote by Watson.  I mentioned that Watson makes a distinction within practical 
judgments as it relates to motivation which Smith does not make.  While Watson’s terminology 
distinguished between judgment (about what ought to be done) and intention (about doing that 
which ought to be done), I think this is another way of simply stating that within the complexities of 
the human mind, where even one single moral judgment can contain several steps of the reasoning 
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process, it is equally plausible that there are multiple judgments aptly fitting under a wider umbrella 
moral judgment which are individually sufficient to be moral judgments on their own, but can also 
be part of the two step process as Watson illustrates.  This opens up the possibility that an agent can 
hold a moral belief in more than just one way.   
 Consider the moral judgments (i) ‘donating to charity is right’ and (ii) ‘I/one ought to 
donate to charity’.  I argue that whereas the former should not be linked to motivation, strictly 
speaking, the latter can.  Let me begin by clarifying the distinction I am looking to make between 
the two judgments.  First, the difference between the two judgments is not one between evaluative 
versus normative judgments.  As both judgments contain normatively loaded concepts (‘right’ and 
‘ought’), they both appropriately belong in the category of being normative judgments.  Secondly, 
the distinction is not one of content as both judgments are concerning the same content – the moral 
normativity of donating to charity.  However, even from within the category of normative 
judgments, there seems to be a specific difference between the two propositions in question: a 
difference in how an agent might come to see what the judgment is trying to assert.  In the case of 
moral judgments of the form ‘ is right’ and ‘I/one ought to ’, the content of the first judgment 
can be seen as more aptly describing how the world is (or should be), whereas the content of the 
second judgment explicitly adds how agents should act regarding the subject matter.  Therefore, it 
seems that we can distinguish the two moral judgments in the sense that an agent might perceive 
each normative judgment differently.  The sense I am trying to convey is that an agent might 
perceive the first judgment as a descriptive assertion of the way a certain moral aspect of the world 
is or should be, whereas the second judgment might be perceived more precisely as a moral 
imperative due to its prescriptive characteristics.  To clarify further, the difference in the agent’s 
perspective of the two judgments should be understood as a psychologically affecting distinction. 
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 Nonetheless it seems that the two judgments are so tightly connected that it is logically 
necessary that the first judgment would entail the second.  After all, if an agent asserts that it is 
morally right to donate to charity, and we assume that a rational agent also acknowledges that a 
feature of morality is that it applies universally to everyone in inferring under what circumstances 
and to whom this assertion applies to
70
, the rational agent would naturally include herself as part of 
the multitude of agents to whom this assertion applies.  If she therefore does not conclude that she 
ought to donate to charity from simply her moral judgment that donating to charity is right – that 
her moral judgment that donating to charity is right gives her a reason to donate – we might say that 
she must be irrational.  I think this is only half right.  I would also accept the logical connection 
between the two judgments.  However, I do not think the connection is quite as tight as it might 
seem from a psychological perspective.   
 Derek Parfit states that “while reasons are provided by the facts, the rationality of our 
desires and acts depends instead on what we believe.”
71
  He further asserts that reason is the more 
fundamental idea of the two; that is, being rational ‘should’ result in responding to reasons.  In the 
quote, Parfit was noting a difference between reasons and rationality.  I think this difference is 
often overlooked since the two terms are often considered to be so closely related.  As Parfit’s quote 
indicates, the difference is one between fact and mental state.  Therefore, following this distinction 
by Parfit, insofar as motivation is concerned, whereas the former might only be perceived by the 
agent as involving judging what is right (therefore the judgment simply offering some fact to the 
agent), the latter seems to involve judging whether we ought to do that which has been asserted by 
the first judgment (in a sense, directing the agent as to how to proceed in her behavior).  Going back 
to Watson again, his passage lent support for an understanding of a distinction between two types of 
                                                          
70
 Moral relativists would deny this.  I leave this issue aside and will just assume an objective understanding 
of morality. 
71
 Parfit 1997: 99. 
46 
 
(moral) judgments and that the connection between them can come apart (at least psychologically 
speaking) as his statement that ‘these are importantly distinct forms of commitment’.  I emphasize 
‘commitment’ because this is precisely what I will argue as being the difference between a moral 
judgment that motivates and one that does not. 
 
3.3. Moore’s Paradox as an Analytical Tool 
 Above I tried to explain two ways an agent can hold moral beliefs.  I believe that this might 
then be able to account for both amoralists and moral agents being able to make sincere moral 
judgments of the same kind.  To elaborate, having such two ways of holding beliefs reflects the 
possibility that amoralists make moral judgments alike those of moral agents insofar as making an 
epistemic commitment, but without a further commitment in a motivating sense.  In this section, I 
look to support my appeal of two ways of holding a moral belief using a moral variation of Moore’s 
paradox to serve as an analytical tool. 
 Consider the following assertion classically depicted to reflect Moore’s paradox:  
‘It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining.’   
The two conjuncts are logically consistent, and thus not an (obvious) contradiction.  However, 
common sense tells us that it is nonetheless absurd to utter the two ideas at the same time in the 
sense that they cannot be both asserted as true.  I believe that Moore’s paradox is helpful in my 
discussion because, in considering the paradoxical nature of the two utterances, it allows for the 
possibility of holding a belief in different ways which could reflect what is happening with 
amoralists and moral agents.  I will suppose that this is the case but one might object that the 
analogy does not work because the absurdity arises from the fact that the utterance of the belief in 
the second conjunct (the ‘belief that it is not raining’) is used like an assertion and thus contradicts 
the assertion of the first conjunct (‘that it is raining’).  That is, the absurdity occurs on the level of 
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assertions, not beliefs.  However, I think that the absurdity is just as easily explainable on the level 
of beliefs in that the agent making the assertion (‘that it is raining’) implies that she believes that 
which she is asserting, and so it could actually be the beliefs that are contradictory along the lines of 
where the agent could be considered as implying: 
‘I believe it is raining, but I don’t believe that it is raining.’   
Using this form of Moore’s paradox then, we can rewrite a moral variant in a manner such as: 
‘I believe that doing  is right, but I don’t believe I ought to do .’   
Because the mystery of Moore’s paradox is that the statement in its entirety can be true, logically 
consistent and not (obviously) contradictory, the amoralist agent should not have any problem 
holding (believing) both conjuncts of the statement at the same time. 
 However, the two conjuncts tell two separate stories reflecting the amoralist’s mindset 
which can be explained by the notion, for example, that if she had a practically rational reason not 
to do , such as if doing  would require a great sacrifice the amoralist agent is not willing to make.  
The first conjunct would represent an epistemic commitment made by the amoralist towards the 
normative content of the moral judgment, while the latter would represent the absence of a more 
embracing state of belief involving motivation.  To make more clear what I have in mind, I suggest 
substituting the terms ‘belief’ in each part with terms that conceptually show a distinctive mental 
state but can also be (at least loosely) reflective of the concept of ‘believing something’.  I propose 
using the term ‘acknowledge’ for the term ‘belief’ in the first conjunct, and the term ‘endorse’ for 
the ‘belief’ term in the second conjunct.  This modified (amoralist) version of the moral variant of 
Moore’s paradox can then be shown as: 
‘I acknowledge that doing  is right, but I don’t endorse that I ought to do .’   
Understood in this way, I believe we no longer have a case where the conjunction of the two 
expressions is absurd if uttered together.  So for the sake of argument, if an amoralist can sincerely 
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make a moral judgment and not be moved, then I think it is fair to say that this variant of Moore’s 
paradox should no longer be considered a paradox, but can be looked at as a solution instead; one 
which reflects the amoralist’s mental state.  As such the value of this Moorean ‘solution’ lies in the 
fact that it allows for the acceptance of forceful normative reasons, while at the same time being 
able to explain the amoralist’s lack of motivation.  The rational amoralist simply does not hold her 
belief in such a way that is associated with a necessary relationship to motivation. 
 
3.4. The Operative State Within Moral Judgments Responsible for Motivation  
 Up to now, I have focused on describing the distinction of two ways of holding a moral 
belief, and arguing for the contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation.  This 
was in effect, in order to reflect the mindset of an amoralist agent.  But what about instances of 
when motivation does follow a moral judgment?  I have yet to explain how motivation actually 
follows from a moral judgment when motivation is present.  In order to understand this aspect of 
my account more clearly, it will be helpful to first discuss the non-Humean mechanism involved in 
the generation of motivation.  While one of my main goals of this thesis is to focus on the 
internalist/externalist perspective, I feel that my positive account can be strengthened if I briefly 
discuss why I believe that understanding the relationship between moral judgment and motivation 
in this non-Humean sense is the most plausible account.  That is, that moral belief somehow 
generates motivation when an agent has a deeper level of commitment than simply that of an 
epistemic one.   
 Part of what is considered unattractive about the externalist view is that the contingent 
nature of moral motivation seems to make an agent’s motivated behavior somewhat arbitrary, as 
Wallace has noted: 
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There is nothing in this view to undergird the claim that those who are morally 
motivated are somehow responding appropriately or correctly to the moral 
distinctions they grasp… from the point of view of practical reason there is nothing 
to require that an agent who endorses moral claims should be motivated to comply 
with them.  In this respect, the desire to be moral seems to be a mere optional extra, 




The concern that is expressed by Wallace’s passage is that positing this type of disconnect between 
moral judgment and motivation seems to distance the character of a morally motivated agent away 
from how we typically understand a ‘virtuous agent’ to be.
73
  While I personally am not convinced 
that this is a serious problem, a more salient feature that I believe supports the non-Humean view is 
the following. 
 From an empirical perspective it is evident that the force of motivation, at least sometimes, 
necessarily correlates to the extent that an agent believes some object to be good, worthwhile, 
valuable, and so on.  For example, the fact that I believe that, at this point in my life, academic 
success is more important than getting married and raising a family provides the explanation for 
why I am more motivated to spend my free time studying rather than going out and socializing.  
However, if several years down the road, I believe that it is now more important to get married and 
raise a family over achieving academic success, then this will, in the same way, explain why I am 
more motivated to mingle and meet people rather than work on my research.  The way Philip Pettit 
explains the idea is that the degree of my motivation in relation to some x is my ‘estimate of the 
                                                          
72
 Wallace 2006: 194. 
73
 McDowell advocates for a purely cognitive view of moral motivation as it reflects the characteristic of the 
virtuous person’s psychology who only needs to perceive what morality requires to be motivated to act.  See 
McDowell (1978 & 1979). 
50 
 
objective goodness or utility’ of that x.
74
  That is, the presence of a certain motivation is entailed by 
the presence of a certain belief.  Therefore, the sensitivity of the force of these motivations in 
relations to the beliefs which they mirror, show that these motivations are dependent on the 
correlating beliefs to the extent that the best explanation is that the motivations were produced by 
the beliefs.  And this in turn supports the non-Humean mechanism that beliefs can generate certain 
motivational force which is what I mean by moral motivation being intrinsic to moral judgment.  So 
with this understanding of how it is possible for moral beliefs to generate motivation, I think it will 
be easier to understand my account of what the operative state responsible for motivation is within 
such moral judgments. 
 Recall that one of the aspects of the distinction between moral judgments of the form 
‘doing  is right’ and ‘I/one ought to ’ is that whereas the former by itself lacks the necessary 
psychological force to motivate an agent, the latter also requires something extra, which is why I 
have argued for an intrinsic but contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation.  
Also recall statement (7) in section 3.1 where I explained what I meant by motivation being 
intrinsic but not necessary to moral judgment: when moral judgments motivate it is necessarily due 
to something internal to the moral judgment.  In this statement, there is a further implication that I 
have yet to specify: that there is a subtle yet important difference between moral judgments where 
an agent is and is not motivated.  Svavarsdóttir’s recipe example invites the question of how 
motivation follows a moral judgment if it is the case that not even acceptance of a moral guideline 
suffices to motivate an agent.  She offers the reason that there is a difference between accepting 
something as being a guide versus accepting something as one’s guide: “Arguably, a person has not 
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accepted something as his guide… unless he follows, by and large (barring weakness of will), its 
directions.”
75
   
 So consider the following.  Even if we grant that we actually know very little as certain 
about what is going on in an agent who seems to be motivated by her moral judgment, introspection 
(or reflecting upon our experiences) seems to indicate that in order for an agent to act upon her 
moral considerations, she must have in some way experienced a call to action.  What I suggest is 
that this experience is an agent essentially ordering herself to follow what the moral imperative is 
requiring of her.  In other words, the agent essentially understands the moral imperative as a 
personal imperative.  Another way to describe the phenomenology of this call to action is that for 
an agent to experience a personal imperative, it is for her to understand that her moral judgment is 
something for her to pursue.  It is the experience of reflecting on one’s own moral judgment 
expressing prescriptions that has binding force on the agent herself. 
 What explains this connection between the personal imperative and motivation is that the 
moral agent who feels obliged to follow through on her moral judgment and actually donates to 
charity, seems to have this feeling of obligation (which, perhaps controversially, I will simply 
understand it as a form of motivation) because she has engaged in some sense with the moral 
considerations at stake.  This can be understood as a difference in commitment level by the agent 
towards the moral considerations at stake.  Take for example the following consideration.  There 
seems to be this dichotomy between an agent-centered conception of practical reason and an other-
regarding conception of morality, as noted by Paul Hurley:   
[T]he demands of practical reason are determined from the personal standpoint, the 
standards of morality from the impersonal standpoint… to demonstrate the rational 
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authority of moral standards… is to show that there is the requisite sort of linkage 
between the impersonal and the personal standpoints such that the properly trained 
agent has decisive reason, from the personal standpoint… to conform his actions to 
moral standards of rightness determined from the impersonal standpoint.
76
 
If we grant that this is the correct conception of both practical reason and morality (which of course 
does not have to be granted but are both fairly common-sense conceptions of those terms), my 
proposed account presents a solution to how practical reasoning and our understanding of morality 
is connected to explain the relationship between moral judgment and motivation.  That is, if an 
agent, through practical deliberation, is motivated from her moral judgment, it makes sense to say 
that the agent must have related a moral consideration that should be perceived as agent-neutral, 
into one that is essentially agent-relative, namely relative to herself.  Thus what I propose is that this 
personal imperative should be understood as an essentially agent-related version of a moral 
imperative.   
 In summarizing my proposal of how to understand the source of moral motivation then, I 
argue that even though our practical rationality can sufficiently agree that something is a 
worthwhile moral guideline, this does not mean that practical rationality will necessarily always 
align with morality insofar as motivation is concerned.  One reason offered was that general moral 
judgments of the form ‘ is right’ seem reasonably to be first and foremost a judgment about what 
is the correct thing to do, and thus likely to have evaluative authority in the absence of practically 
prescriptive authority, and hence of motivation.  It sounds plausible to me to understand the 
relationship between motivation and the type of judgments most aptly understood as personal 
imperatives as a necessary connection.  However, as I have argued so far throughout this chapter, a 
personal imperative might not necessarily follow a ‘one ought to ’ moral judgment (a judgment 
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implied by a ‘ is right’ moral judgment in a rational agent), and so motivation seems to have a 
contingent connection to moral judgment generally speaking.  What is thus required for motivation 
to occur is that a practically rational agent needs not only to agree with the authority of the moral 
considerations, but to align herself with it as saying that those considerations are something that she 
needs to follow, that there is a reason for her to follow it, with the distinction between moral 
judgments that do and do not motivate being understood as a difference in commitment level by the 
agent.
77
   
 
IV. Can Amoralists Really Make Genuine Moral Judgments? 
 
 One of the aspects of my proposed view is that an agent can make a moral judgment 
without being motivated (hence endorsing externalism).  Any internalist would reject this proposal 
right away and, as I briefly mentioned in 1.4, would simply explain away this aspect of my view as 
that the amoralist is not making a sincere moral judgment but instead is making a judgment in the 
inverted commas sense.  Since the possibility of holding two moral beliefs – one that can motivate 
and one that does not – is a key aspect of my view, in order to strengthen my proposal I address this 
objection in the remainder of my paper before I finish with my closing remarks.  
 In discussing the two ways an agent can hold a moral belief, I have been using the moral 
expressions ‘ is right’ and ‘I/one ought to ’.  It actually seems plausible to me that these 
expressions can be made by agents from multiple different perspectives and with various 
phenomenological experiences.  Some may fall under what the internalist would consider a sincere 
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moral judgment (entailing the presence of motivation as a prerequisite) while some would be 
understood as insincere (or inverted commas) judgments regardless of the fact that the mental states 
contain normative content.  But because I believe that an agent’s perspective and phenomenological 
experiences from whence they utter such moral statements can vary so greatly, I think the dynamic 
is not strictly limited to a ‘black and white’ case of either being or not being a real or insincere 
moral judgment.  Rather, what I personally think is that moral expressions are highly complex 
statements and there could be a number of various psychological states that can in some way be 
related to the normative content of such expressions.  However, this is not the place for such a 
discussion (and honestly speaking, I do not have enough background in this area to carry such a 
debate forward).  Thus I restrict myself to strictly dealing with the inverted commas objection as it 
used by internalists against the plausibility of making a genuine moral judgment without being 
motivated.  I begin with an introduction and initial response to the internalist’s justification for 
claiming that amoralists cannot but be making moral judgments in an inverted commas sense. 
 
4.1. The Inverted Commas Objection 
 Sometimes the inverted commas objection seems to amount to the idea that an amoralist is 
(i) trying to deceive the listener by just coming off as making a genuine moral judgment without 
sincerely believing in what she is claiming.  More commonly though, as partially alluded to in 
footnote 19, the idea is that (ii) the amoralist is somehow ignorant of the fact that she is not really 
making a genuine moral judgment – and that she is rather judging from the viewpoint of what she 
believes other people, or society, would judge in regard to said moral content.  Of course such acts 
are possible: an agent could, for whatever reason, try to deceive the listener by making an insincere 
moral judgment; as well as in other occasions, such an agent could really just be ignorant in the 
sense that she does not have the capacity to truly understand the concepts ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ which 
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she nonetheless continues to use.  Claim (ii) is the more serious contention against the externalist.  
In the following sections, I deal with each claim separately.  First, I show that claim (i) is not a 
serious threat to the externalist assertion for the plausibility of the amoralist.  I then discuss Smith’s 
variation of claim (ii), as I believe it is a stronger version of this particular contention, and provide 
my arguments against Smith’s criticisms. 
 One thing to note is that it seems that in both cases, the agents can be correctly understood 
as expressing moral statements.  After all, the statements contain moral phrases which are uttered 
by the agents.  However, there seems to be this commonsense assumption that moral motivation 
normally, perhaps somewhat reliably, follows sincere moral judgments.  This assumption has strong 
phenomenological support, and arguments such as Smith’s depiction of the ‘good and strong-willed 
person’
78
 seem to also reflect that this is an assumption that cannot be easily dismissed.  Against 
this backdrop then, it seems that the putative amoralist is a case of deviance that needs to be 
explained away because it does not match with our ordinary moral experiences and their parallel 
psychological explanations.  Thus the resulting consequence is explaining them away as not being 
moral judgments proper.  The problem though is that proper in this instance is then understood as 
reflecting the ‘usual’ intuitions of what constitutes moral judgments (reflecting the assumption).   
 Relatedly, the conflict between internalists and externalists arises when the internalist 
claims that the inverted commas use is universally the case for every instance of a putative 
amoralist.  If that is the claim, then the internalist objection seems quite implausible to externalists 
in light of the fact that it would require for the internalist to have a precise understanding of the 
psychology of every amoralist.  But the fact of the matter is that the internalist does not make this 
claim coming from some insight regarding the psychology of an amoralist, but rather from what 
they accept as a conceptual truth in regard to the connection between moral judgment and 
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motivation, with such a view disregarding the plausibility of an amoralist right from the start.  Thus, 
even if the conception of an amoralist is patently false, the internalist argument fails to show that 
this is the case unless they can somehow provide an adequate psychological account of the 
amoralist which reflects their view.  Thus it seems to me that the internalist claim of the necessary 
connection between moral judgment and motivation as a conceptual truth rests on substantial a 
posteriori assumptions about our actual moral experiences.  Of course there is nothing wrong with 
making and trying to understand our a posteriori assumptions about our moral experiences.  
However if this is the case, then the internalist claim regarding the relationship between moral 
judgment and motivation cannot be served as a substantial a priori constraint on theories of moral 
judgment.   
 
4.2. Insincere Moral Statements 
 To say that an amoralist’s moral judgment is simply a form of trying to deceive the listener, 
does not really appear to be what either the internalist or externalist are wanting to refer to insofar 
as what seems to be entailed by making a moral judgment.  After all, if the purpose of the amoralist 
expressing the moral statement is to have someone else follow it without the agent having any 
inclination to sincerely follow it herself, then this seems to simply be an insincere moral statement; 
one that might not even require for the amoralist to have a genuine conceptual grasp of the moral 
terms involved.    
 Suppose Lucy and her best friend, Mina, are attending a music festival together.  Lucy 
knows that Mina has a drinking problem and is in a recovery program.  Lucy also enjoys drinking 
very much and drinks on a regular basis but not to a degree that would be considered irresponsible.  
During the festival both Lucy and Mina are offered complimentary cocktails by a waitress.  Lucy, 
sensing that Mina is visibly tempted, says “it is (morally) better not to drink alcohol” without really 
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thinking there would be a problem with having just one glass.  Here, Lucy is most likely expressing 
an opinion which she does not personally agree with.  If so, we can consider this a case of a person 
truly making an insincere statement.  The specific fact that Lucy does not want to put Mina in the 
agonizing position of having to watch her drink while standing right next to each other, causes Lucy 
to utter a moral statement which she does not really endorse. 
 We can see here that, while there is an obvious connection and consistency between Lucy’s 
moral statement and her behavior (she continues to refrain from drinking in front of Mina), this 
should not be construed as reflecting the internalist position.  For the internalist contention is that 
the moral expression must reflect a genuine belief in the judgment (which under my proposal, the 
epistemic commitment would suffice to satisfy this condition).  But that is clearly not the case in 
Lucy’s situation.  After all, Lucy would most definitely have no problem drinking when she is not 
around Mina’s presence and does not have to worry about her feelings.  Since Lucy is not actually 
giving her approval to the content “it is better to not drink alcohol”, there is no normative content 
that would move her to act accordingly were she in ‘normal circumstances’. 
 In other words, we can see that for Lucy there was a clear reason to utter a moral statement 
which she does not endorse.  This led to her ‘deceiving’ both the cocktail waitress as well as her 
friend Mina.  If we were to ask her how she felt about drinking alcohol in a responsible manner, she 
would most likely express a statement that is completely different from what she uttered in front of 
Mina, as long as she is not in a similar situation.  So the internalist has every reason here to assume 
that Lucy is making an insincere moral judgment, but the externalist would have no problem also 
accepting this claim as Lucy’s purported moral expressions would not count as what the externalist 
would consider a real moral judgment either, let alone a sincere one. 
 However, what if Lucy actually insists that drinking alcohol is bad but she just simply does 
not care and is not motivated to act correspondingly?  What if the situation was changed to where 
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Lucy never had a friend like Mina and where Lucy is more of a moderate drinker who might drink 
occasionally or at social gatherings but even though she responds the same – that drinking alcohol is 
bad – she nevertheless does not hesitate to drink when the occasion arises?  We no longer have the 
reason that we had to allow us to assume that she was making an insincere moral judgment and the 
only factor that seems to indicate that she might not be agreeing with her moral statement (besides 
the fact that she does not completely abstain from drinking) is simply that she lacks the motivation.  
The internalist answer would presumably be the same, that Lucy cannot be making a genuine moral 
judgment since she is still not motivated accordingly.  However the situation has completely 
changed and so it would seem that, at the very least, the internalist answer fails to accommodate this 
particular aspect that is different from the first scenario.  That is, this change in particulars calls for 
a reassessment of whether Lucy is, as a matter of fact, still making the same inverted commas 
response or not; but for an internalist, reassessment is unnecessary since their answer will simply 
correlate accordingly to whether she is motivated or not.  How would a third-party observer 
conclude of Lucy’s moral judgments?   
 
4.3. Non-Cognitivist Versus Cognitivist’s Use of the Inverted Commas Objection 
 One way an observer might conclude is in a form of the second internalist response, that 
Lucy does not really understand the concepts involved in the normative content and so does not 
endorse the moral content that it is better to not drink alcohol when she utters those words.  Rather, 
what she is doing is likened to merely remarking upon a sociological observation than a sincere 
statement of one’s convictions; much like how an anthropologist would report on the idiosyncratic 
moral sentiments of an indigenous tribe located remotely in the jungle.  This is the contention made 
famous by R.M. Hare.   
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 Hare is known as a prescriptivist, a form of non-cognitivism.  Non-cognitivism is the ideal 
position from which to argue that amoralists are uttering moral expressions from an inverted 
commas sense – since under their view, moral judgments are identical to motivating states and so a 
necessity of expressing a sincere moral judgment is to be motivated.  I will not argue against the 
non-cognitivist’s charge against the amoralist making an inverted commas judgment because I have 
taken a cognitivist position regarding what moral judgments are (and to be honest, I am not even 
sure I can provide an adequate response other than argue that moral judgments should be construed 
as cognitive mental states rather than simply expressions of approval or denial).  So in the 
remaining sections, I discuss a cognitivist internalist’s charge against the amoralist as making an 
inverted commas judgment, namely Smith’s charge.  Before going into Smith’s criticism 
specifically, let me provide some preliminary thoughts regarding the general cognitivist internalist 
charge of the amoralist’s inability to make sincere moral judgments. 
 Unlike the non-cognitivist, the inverted commas argument seems to lose some of its force 
when considered from the cognitivist position because of what this position entails regarding the 
make-up of moral judgments.  If, under the cognitivist view, moral judgments purport to be mental 
states which first and foremost provide a description of certain normative features of the world 
which then somehow have the ability to motivate agents that are in cognitive contact with said 
contents, then (reflecting Smith’s internalist view from chapter II) the most likely explanation for 
the manufacturing of motivation comes from a second aspect of the cognitivist position; that moral 
beliefs are a type of evaluative beliefs where the agent places value on the normative content of the 
moral judgment.  And it is from this valuing of the normative content – or the acknowledgment of 
the value of the normative content tied in to a specific internalist conception of practical rationality 
– that motivation occurs.   
60 
 
 Now if valuing were simply a form of desiring then the cognitivist picture would be fairly 
easily explainable as well.  The moral judgment generates the necessary motivating state of valuing 
required for motivation.  But, as was already analyzed by Smith himself, valuing cannot be reduced 
to a form of desiring.  If valuing was conceptually reducible to some form of desiring, then it would 
seem impossible for an agent to take a critical stance against that which she desires.  However, there 
are plenty of examples in the literature (as well as in real life) that serve to deny such an analysis.  
Consider the recovering drug addict who has a desire for another dose of the illegal substance yet 
does not value doing so as she is sincerely trying to clean up her life.  Inversely, there is the 
example of a struggling but recovering drug addict who tries hard to align her desires to her newly 
rediscovered values of living a clean and sober lifestyle.   
 One might offer the explanation here that what the struggling drug addict is doing is simply 
trying to line up her first-order desires to her second-order desires.  But this would not serve the 
internalist as Nagel (himself a cognitivist internalist) has brought up an important distinction 
between such differing types of desires and that the latter type is best construed as a mental state 
that possesses cognitive status since they have been derived from our beliefs about what matters (or 
what is valuable).
79
  Thus, it seems more appropriate to analyze valuing as a cognitive mental state, 
which can be aptly explained as a mental state involving cognitive reasoning processes to assess the 
worth of something through means of considering its strengths and weaknesses, adducing various 
reasons and judging their relations to one another, bearing in mind less salient aspects, etc.
80
   
 So the cognitivist internalist’s use of the inverted commas argument has a burden that the 
non-cognitivist does not have to bear.  We can see this burden from another perspective as well.  As 
already indicated above, cognitivists identify moral judgments as essentially pertaining descriptive, 
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semantically meaningful and epistemically assessable content.  In other words, moral judgments are 
such that they concern certain matters of the world which remain the same no matter the 
accompanying attitudes of agents who make them.  As such, the assertion that two people in the 
exact same circumstances, whose moral expressions have exactly the same content, are meaning 
two different things, strictly because one is motivated and the other is not, does not seem very 
convincing (hopefully it is obvious that my cognitivist externalist view would be a solution to this 
problem as distinguishing between two ways of holding a moral belief can serve as an explanation 
to this scenario).  Nonetheless, Smith provides a compelling inverted commas objection coming 
from the cognitivist internalist perspective.   
 
4.4. Smith’s Inverted Commas Objection 
 Noting an objection from Brink, Smith has “misgivings, at least as regards the details of 
Hare’s version.”
81
  He believes that the sentiment behind Hare’s inverted commas objection is on 
the right track but needs to be refined in order to really be able to defend against the externalist 
assertion for the plausibility of the amoralist.  Smith offers the following explanation as to what the 
inverted commas objection should consist of.  Roughly speaking, Smith believes that it is not ad hoc 
for internalists – or in his case, ‘defenders of the practicality requirement’ – to claim that amoralists 
cannot be making genuine moral judgments even if this is, at most, all that the internalist can claim.  
Smith’s inverted commas objection amounts to the assertion that a person who makes a moral 
judgment without being motivated lacks sufficient ‘mastery of moral concepts’ and is therefore not 
making a genuine moral judgment.
82
  That is, an amoralist cannot help but fail in making a sincere 
moral judgment because such an agent, who uses moral terms and lacks motivation, does not really 
possess a genuine understanding of the concepts belonging to the terms involved.  In order to see 
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why this is not an ad hoc claim, Smith explains what holding mastery of moral concepts amounts to 
via an analogy regarding what is entailed by having mastery of color terms. 
 Suppose a person blind from birth nonetheless has a completely reliable facility to use color 
terms accurately.  Would we ascribe to this person genuine possession of color concepts?  The 
argument progresses towards what the conditions are for being able to attribute genuine possession 
of color concepts.  For example, both the internalist and externalist would accept reliable usage as 
being one necessary condition.  Where the disagreement lies is that the internalist also maintains 
that visual experience is a prerequisite, whereas the externalist denies this as being necessary.  Of 
course visual experience here is understood as being analogous to moral motivation.  While the 
color analogy, on its own, is simply an appeal to one’s intuition
83
, the point for Smith is that, just as 
visual experience seems to be a necessary condition in order to attribute to someone mastery of 
color concepts, moral motivation seems to be a necessary condition in order to attribute to someone 
mastery of moral concepts – that is, for an agent to be able to make genuine moral judgments.   
 However, to say that this is Smith’s main point regarding the color analogy would be unfair 
to Smith’s contention, as he acknowledges that the color analogy by itself cannot seal the victory 
for internalism.  Rather, the conclusion Smith wants to draw is that the externalist cannot appeal to 
the blind person seemingly being able to use color terms reliably as evidence that amoralists are 
plausible; for this would simply be begging the question against the internalist assertion of the 
necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation.  In other words, simply denying that 
visual experience is a necessary condition for a blind person (or anyone for that matter) to be able to 
make real color judgments – that is, have genuine possession of color concepts – is simply 
presupposing externalism, and not arguing for it.  One thing to point out here is that at the same 
time, the externalist could likewise claim that the internalist assertion, that motivation (visual 
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experience) is a necessary condition for possession of moral (color) concepts, is begging the 
question against the externalist’s contention of the plausibility of the amoralist.  Either way, I 
believe we have grounds to question Smith’s version of the inverted commas objection, primarily 
his assertion that an amoralist lacks sufficient ‘mastery of moral concepts’.   
 First off, lacking sufficient mastery of moral concepts could be misinterpreted as in a sense 
being a charge of unintelligibility on the amoralist, at least insofar as moral terms are concerned.  
Consider first that Smith differentiates his inverted commas objection from that of Hare’s 
‘sociological observation’ version because he notes that: 
[T]here seems to be nothing incoherent about the idea of an amoralist who claims 
to have special insight into what is really right and wrong; an amoralist whose 
judgments about what it is right and wrong to do are therefore, even by her own 
lights, out of line with the judgments of others.  But if this is right, then the 
judgments of amoralist can hardly be thought of as judgments about what other 
people judge to be right and wrong.
84
 
So then, if an amoralist utters terms such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and she seems to be using these 
terms in appropriate context in whatever circumstances in which she finds herself using them in – 
and the amoralist is also not to be understood as speaking of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in the sociological 
observation sense – then what is it that the amoralist agent is supposed to be meaning here precisely?  
It seems that such an agent cannot be meaning anything at all – that she is uttering something akin 
to nonsense.  But if this is the sense in which Smith’s contention as a charge of unintelligibility is 
supposed to be understood, it seems much less convincing to argue that an amoralist just utters 
nonsense, rather than that the amoralist is making a real moral judgment but just happens to not be 
motivated for some specific practical reason.  After all, concepts such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, while 
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abstract, are not particularly difficult concepts to understand in an everyday practical usage sense 
since we are all so familiar with these terms already.    
 Furthermore, I question whether his color analogy even works at all.  The reason I think 
that it might not go through is because visual experience and motivation are quite different mental 
states.  Whereas even Smith would agree that motivation is a non-cognitive state, visual experience 
is most commonly understood as a cognitive state, one that purports to represent a certain aspect of 
the world.
85
  Relating the color example to what it means to have mastery of moral concepts would 
then be asking the externalist to accept an analogy where the comparable mental states are not 
categorically the same.  Therefore, it seems conceivable that the externalist can grant Smith that 
visual experience is a requisite for having mastery of color terms, while maintaining at the same 
time that motivation is not required in order to have mastery of moral terms.  However, for the sake 
of argument, I bracket this potential inconsistency aside. 
 
4.5. A Rebuttal to Smith’s View 
 The idea that an amoralist lacks sufficient mastery of moral concepts seems to imply that it 
is due to some incapacity that she is unable to understand moral terms appropriately enough to 
make sincere moral judgments.  But recall at the end of section 1.4 I stated that an amoralist need 
not be someone who is never motivated by a moral judgment.  To fail to be motivated on just one 
occasion suffices to be properly termed an amoralist.  What this also implies is that such a person 
would not be labeled an amoralist until that first point in time when she makes a moral judgment 
without being motivated.  If so, then consider a ‘recently turned amoralist’: someone who has 
always been motivated by her moral judgments just like any other moral agent, until one day she 
has what she perceives to be (in the loosest sense) an epiphany of sorts regarding the authority of 
                                                          
85
 However, even this point needs qualification as some might suggest that it is, at best, controversial 
whether visual experience is representational. 
65 
 
morality.  It is not that her moral compass has changed, she continues to make the same 
discernments and draw the same conclusions using the same moral terms as before, except that it is 
no longer the case that these judgments are accompanied by motivation.  
 How would Smith respond in regard to such an agent under the definition of the amoralist 
he has provided?  Would he say that such a person either (i) never had mastery of moral concepts, 
or (ii) lost it at the moment she stopped being motivated?  It would seem that neither answer is very 
appealing.  If Smith chooses (i), then he would need to provide a plausible account of how someone 
who does not have a genuine understanding (mastery) of moral terms can nonetheless be motivated 
accordingly; or Smith is essentially admitting that one could make genuine moral judgments at 
some point in one’s life without ever having mastery of moral concepts.  However, if Smith 
concludes (ii), that this agent somehow lost mastery of moral concepts the moment she stopped 
being motivated, that would give rise to a whole set of issues on its own.  First off, such a claim 
would bring about questions regarding whether someone could lose mastery of a concept after the 
fact that the agent has already acquired it (excluding instances of mental diseases, such as 
Alzheimer’s, playing a primary cause); or what exactly mastery entails (as mentioned above, I 
would be inclined to think that Smith would not want to commit himself to the position that if one 
does not have mastery of moral concepts, then the moral expressions of such a supposed amoralist 
is akin to uttering nonsense).  Second, and more crucially, whatever answer Smith provides would 
still be unsatisfactory in light of the fact that whatever it was that caused her to no longer be 
motivated, at the very least we can still ascribe to her continuity and consistency in her cognitive 
faculties.  
 Relating this to Smith’s color example, even if we grant that visual experience is a 
necessary condition of mastery of color terms so that a person blind from birth does not have 
mastery of color terms, if a person went blind in their adult life, and if that person is able to reliably 
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use color terms even after she went blind, I would imagine that we would have to attribute to her 
mastery of color terms, seeing as how she did have plenty of visual experiences of what blue, or red, 
or yellow is like prior to going blind.  The fact of the matter is that this blind person can not only 
use color terms reliably, but when she uses color terms in her speech – such as uttering the phrase 
‘please grab the red jacket for me’ – she is not intending here to mean ‘please grab the jacket which 
society or other people have deemed to be red’, but actually intending to mean ‘please grab the 
jacket which as a matter of fact is red’.
86
  
 Finally, from an observational standpoint it seems that Smith’s inverted commas objection 
is counterintuitive.  Imagine someone who became colorblind at a certain point in time during his 
adult life but nobody knows about it.  She continues to point out the same color, red, in her 
expressions depicting apples, street signs and other objects which are as a matter of fact red as if she 
were no different from any non-colorblind person.  It would seem that, simply from observation 
without being privy to the fact that she is colorblind, Smith would be inclined to judge this agent as 
having possession (mastery) of color concepts.  It is only when she reveals that she is colorblind, 
and therefore does not have the requisite sense data to confirm whether the objects she is referring 
to actually possess the color red or not, that Smith would change his stance regarding whether the 
agent has possession (mastery) of the color concept red.   
 Of course it can hardly be said that this (hypothetically) mistaken identification by Smith 
would therefore overthrow his claim.  Smith argues for a conceptual connection and therefore it 
would not suffice for a mistake from an observational standpoint, or any empirical evidence to the 
contrary, to undermine Smith’s argument even if it was made by Smith himself.  What this 
argument does, however, is put the internalist at a disadvantage from the empirical perspective.  
Remember, the internalist argues for the conceptual impossibility of an amoralist, whereas the 
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externalist simply needs to show one instance where such a conception is possible.  Therefore, even 
if a thousand instances reflecting internalism are witnessed; a singular, genuine instance reflecting 
externalism (the amoralist) would suffice to push any empirical argument the externalist way.  So 
when considering which side, the internalist or externalist, seems to be begging the question on the 
other, it seems to me that there is more reason to think that the internalist is begging the question 
against the externalist.  If nothing else, at the very least I think we can conclude that the burden of 
proof is greater on the internalist.
87
   
 
4.6. An Amoralist’s Judgment is the Same in Kind as Those of a Moral Agent’s 
 In differentiating his inverted commas argument from Hare’s, Smith mentions that “the 
point is not that amoralists really make judgments of some other kind: about what other people 
judge to be right and wrong, for example.  The point is rather that the very best we can say about 
amoralists is that they try to make moral judgments but fail.”
88
  The phrase ‘not…judgments of 
some other kind’ is what interests me.  Let me try and expand upon this point as far as what Smith 
might have in mind here.  Possibly Smith could make the following statement, ‘It might be difficult 
to provide an account of how exactly we should understand the amoralist’s psychological state.  But 
we can be certain of two things: one, it is not a genuine moral judgment; and two, it is not a 
psychological state that differs in kind from that of a genuine moral judgment.’  Suppose that this is 
Smith’s contention and that he is correct: an amoralist’s judgment is not the same as a moral agent’s 
judgment, but it does not differ in type from such moral agent’s judgments.  Not only do I believe 
that this claim is plausible, but I also believe that this is precisely the kind of picture that 
accommodates my positive account on the relationship between moral judgment and motivation.   
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 So bearing in mind that amoralists do not make the same moral judgments as moral agents, 
but they are the same in ‘kind’, an amoralist’s judgment must miss some aspect or element that 
differentiates her judgment from that of a moral agent’s.  Presumably, the amoralist’s psychological 
state in which she is in contact with the normative reasons that are candidates as moral facts lacks 
something that the state in which the moral agent is in contact with the same normative reasons has.  
The question is are these elements essential to what should be considered a genuine moral judgment, 
or are they additional features?  If we grant that this question cannot be easily answered due to the 
differing intuitions of internalists and externalists, then I propose my view as a plausible way to 
answer this question.   
 Following my proposed account, it would be the case that the amoralist’s judgment is 
missing the element of the agent being personally engaged with the moral content and so not seeing 
the moral imperative as a personal imperative.  I believe that this aspect should not be considered as 
an essential element of what constitutes making a real moral judgment.  Yes, the normative content 
of moral judgments applies to each and every individual, and thus each and every individual should 
take a personal interest in the moral judgments they make.  But at the same time, if we are to uphold 
the objective and universal nature of the normative content of the moral judgments – that they apply 
to everyone equally, not just especially to Tommy or Sally or Lucy or whoever happens to be 
engaged with the contents at that time – then I do not think that the personalization aspect should be 
considered an essential element of what constitutes a genuine moral judgment.  This should be 
particularly true for moral realists, who would assert that moral facts exist independently of rational 
agents (I do not want to imply that I commit myself to moral realism, I am just making a point that 
seems important). 
 Let me end by posing one last question regarding Smith’s general cognitivist internalist 
view as a final criticism.  If Smith’s internalist assertion of the necessary connection between moral 
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judgment and motivation is to be understood as a conceptual claim
89
, and if Smith’s cognitivist 
understanding of the etiology of motivation is that the content of a moral judgment causes (or 
generates) the motivation
90
, then how should we make sense of how the connection between moral 
judgment and motivation is both conceptually necessary and causal at the same time?  For it seems 
to me that if the connection was conceptually necessary, it means that one cannot exist without the 
other.  But then how could a moral judgment exist prior to it generating motivation?  Further, 
should a moral judgment at its conception (just prior to it producing the motivation) be considered 
an insincere moral judgment since it has yet to be connected to motivation at that stage?  Perhaps 
this question erroneously makes use of the conception of time-ordering and perhaps there is 
something regarding the notion of causality that I have yet to understand (I admit that I am not 
nearly learned enough in either of these concepts from a philosophical perspective).  Or perhaps this 
is a valid question that a cognitivist internalist view such as Smith’s in particular has to deal with.  
Either way, I welcome any kind of answer by a cognitive internalist and such answers could very 
well help as a response to my criticisms against Smith’s inverted commas objection as well.   
 
Closing Remarks 
 The goal of my master’s thesis was to provide a comprehensive, perhaps somewhat 
unconventional yet hopefully convincing, solution to understanding the relationship between moral 
judgment and motivation.  The position I forwarded took externalism and non-Humeanism as its 
framework and argued for an intrinsic yet contingent connection between moral judgment and 
motivation.  In order to support this externalist view, I first started off in chapter II by targeting an 
internalist account which I felt was most adequately contrasting to mine; that being Smith’s 
cognitivist internalist view.  I laid out what his view amounted to and provided my arguments 
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against this form of internalism throughout chapter II.  Initially I argued that Smith’s account failed 
to make a certain type of distinction within practical judgments in the form of seeing the best means 
to one’s ends versus pursuing (or intending) the best means to one’s ends.  I argued that these are 
two importantly distinct forms of mental acts which do not necessarily always coincide.  
Furthermore, this lent support to the possibility that we can have doubts about the rational authority 
of morality and that such doubt can lead to failure in motivation.  In the latter half of chapter II I 
forwarded what I believed to be the key problem with internalist accounts such as Smith’s: that they 
conflate the action-guiding nature of morality – that is, what it means for something to be normative 
– with moral motivation.   
 Chapter III consisted of the layout of my positive account.  As a starting point to my 
positive account, I proposed that there is more than one way an agent can hold a moral belief.  I 
distinguished between moral judgments of the form ‘ is right’ and ‘I/one ought to ’.  I supported 
my distinction by integrating a moral variant of Moore’s paradox as an analytical tool.  The key 
idea of using this moral variant was to show the possibility of two ways of holding a moral belief 
that are distinct and so could reflect the mindset of an amoralist.  I did so by positing the terms 
‘acknowledging’ and ‘endorsing’ respectively to each half of the conjunct of a moral version of a 
Moorean paradox to serve as the key references to the ‘belief’ terms so that the statement is no 
longer a paradox, but a solution of how an unmotivated person could hold such opposing views.  
Further, focusing on the latter (motivationally conducive) form of ‘I/one ought to ’, I tried to 
provide an explanation of how motivation occurs from the utterance, or holding, of such a moral 
belief by an agent.  I argued that the operative state was turning an impersonal moral imperative 
into an agent-relative personal imperative.  That is, motivation occurs when an agent personally 
engages with the moral considerations at stake. 
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 In the first half of chapter IV, I introduced the inverted commas objection levied by 
internalists upon the externalists positing of an amoralist.  The discussion revolved around whether 
it was possible for an amoralist agent to genuinely make a real moral judgment; and if not, then 
what was meant by their so called ‘moral judgments’.  Here I argued that the internalist use of the 
inverted commas objection was based on what they conceived of to be a conceptual truth regarding 
the relationship between moral judgment and motivation, when what they needed was to provide a 
psychological account for why it is the case that the amoralist cannot help but utter moral judgments 
in the inverted commas sense.  I further argued that even their contention of the necessary 
connection between moral judgment and motivation as a conceptual truth was not an a priori 
argument at all, but based upon a posteriori assumptions regarding our moral experiences.  After 
my criticism of the inverted commas objection, I provided an example of what should be considered 
an insincere moral judgment and how it differs from what the externalist is asserting regarding the 
amoralist agent who is unmotivated by her moral judgment.  I then further reduced the domain of 
the objection to just the cognitivist argument of the amoralist making moral judgments from an 
inverted commas sense as a transition to my final chapter. 
 The latter half of chapter IV was dedicated towards describing and arguing against Smith’s 
cognitivist internalist view and his use of the inverted commas objection.  Smith’s inverted commas 
objection amounted to the idea that amoralists fail to make genuine moral judgments because they 
lack ‘sufficient mastery of moral concepts’.  In support of his claim, Smith uses an analogy 
regarding the use of color terms to argue that, just as visual experience seems a necessary condition 
for mastery of color terms, so does motivation seem to be a necessary condition for mastery of 
moral terms.  I responded that even if we grant that visual experience was a necessary condition for 
mastery of color terms, his analogy still fails to account for the amoralist agent who once used to 
have the necessary condition satisfied, but through some event, no longer does while maintaining all 
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other cognitive abilities the same.  I further tried to analyze what Smith’s lack of sufficient mastery 
of moral terms could be meant to infer and one of the possible conclusions was that the amoralist 
agent is expressing utter nonsense.  I surmised that if this was the conclusion, the externalist 
explanation was far more convincing than Smith’s as far as what the amoralist agent could be 
meaning by his use of moral terms.   
 Lastly, I pointed out one final aspect of Smith’s version of the inverted commas objection – 
that an amoralist’s judgment is not different in kind from that of a moral agent’s – and suggested 
that we could expand upon this point to support my positive account of an agent holding moral 
beliefs in more than one way.  If an amoralist’s judgment is the same in kind of that of a moral 
agent’s then what is missing is an additional feature or element which is responsible for motivation.  
I argued that my position could provide an answer as to what that additional element was, but from 
an externalist aspect where that element was not crucial to defining what a real moral judgment is.  I 
wrap up my master’s thesis with these final thoughts.     
 I submit that there are two primary purposes for an agent making a moral judgment.  One is 
to declare what is the morally right or wrong thing to do.  The other is to hope to influence another 
person’s behavior by offering strong moral reasons.  Insofar as the latter is concerned, we hope that 
people agree with the normative content of our moral reasons and that they will therefore behave 
accordingly.  But there is a very important implication regarding why we hope that they will behave 
accordingly insofar as entailing whether one is truly motivated as a result of making a genuine 
moral judgment or not.  And that is, that we hope that people will behave accordingly not simply 
because we, the presenter of the moral judgment, believe that it is correct to follow the moral 
judgment; but because we hope that the listener accepts that the normative contents of the moral 
judgment are good reasons for them as well – that the normative reasons are also their reasons for 
action.  Reflecting Smith’s rationalist account, which is perhaps counter-serving to some of the 
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points I have made in this thesis, we expect, amongst other things, that people will want to adhere to 
moral reasons because they serve as moral reasons for them and it will not accord with their sense 
of rational agency to act otherwise if they have sincerely accepted the moral reasons.  Thus, in my 
mind, what makes a genuine moral judgment a moral judgment which also motivates is because 
when we act upon them, the moral judgment has engaged each individual agent personally – that 
each agent not only accepts the moral judgment, but also endorses the content of the moral 
judgment as something that he or she needs to follow.   
 As one last (counterintuitive) point to the main arguments of my thesis, I end with the 
thought that the interrelations between moral judgment and motivation is not as simple and direct as 
we would like it to be.  There is a good chance that the relationship between the two is quite 
complex and multifaceted and presumably my proposal today barely scratched at the surface.  This 
might then be a substantial reason for why neither side of the debate between internalists and 
externalists has been able to take a dominant position over the other.  What I hope is that my 
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이 논문의 목표는 두 가지이다. 첫째, 나는 전통적이지는 않지만 타당한 외재주의적 
설명을 제공할 것이다. 둘째, 나의 외재주의적 설명을 뒷받침하기 위해서, 내재주의적 
입장을 반박할 것이다. 첫 번째 목표와 관련해서, 내 입장의 큰 틀은 내재주의의 
양상(modal) 주장을 거부하고, 인지적 내재주의의 동기에 대한 원인(etiological) 주장을 
받아들이는 것이다. 달리 말해, 나는 도덕적 판단과 동기 간의 관계가 
내재적(intrinsic)이면서도 우연적(contingent)이라고 주장한다. 즉 도덕적 판단을 이루고 
있는 것이 도덕적 동기의 원인이지만, 그렇다고 해서 도덕적 판단이 항상 도덕적 동기를 
유발하는 것은 아니다. 두 번째 목표와 관련해서, 나는 나의 입장에 반대되는 마이클 
스미스(Michael Smith)의 인지적 내재주의적 입장을 비판할 것이다.   
스미스는 완전히 합리적인 행위자는 자신이 받아들이는 규범적 이유에 따라서 욕구할 
것이라고 주장한다. 따라서 내재주의는 참이고, 행위에 대한 규범적 이유를 인정하지만 
적절히 동기 부여되지는 않는 모든 행위자는 어떤 의미에서 실천적으로 비합리적이다. 
나는 도덕적 판단이 합리적 행위의 중심 요건인 일관성 조건을 항상 충족시키는 것은 
아님을 보여주는 논증을 제시해서, 도덕적 판단이 합리성의 규범들에 의해서 제약된다는 
생각에 이의를 제기할 것이다. 또한 나는 스미스의 입장과 같은 내재주의적 입장이 도덕의 
행위-지침적 성격과 동기를 혼동하는 오류를 저지르고 있다고 주장할 것이다. 달리 말해, 
그 입장이 어떤 것이 규범적이다라는 것의 의미와 어떤 것이 동기부여적이다라는 것의 
의미를 혼동하고 있다고 비판할 것이다.  
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나의 외재주의적 입장을 옹호하면서, 나는 도덕적 판단을 내리는 숙고 과정에는 
적어도 두 가지 형태의 결정이 있다고 주장할 것이다. 하나는 (도덕적으로) 최선인 것이 
무엇인지에 대한 판단으로 이해될 수 있다. 다른 하나는 (도덕적으로) 최선인 것을 실천할 
것이라는 판단으로 이해될 수 있다. 나는 이 구분을 더 자세히 설명해서, 후자의 판단만이 
동기를 형성한다는 것을 보일 것이다. 그리고 나는 이러한 도덕적 판단에 속해 있는, 
동기를 형성하는 과정이 행위자-중립적인 명령(impersonal moral imperative)을 행위자-
중심적인 명령(personal imperative)으로 전환시켜주는 더 강한 정도의 결심이라고 
주장할 것이다.  
끝으로 나는 ‘따옴표 반론(inverted commas objection)’을 다룰 것이다. 이 반론은 
도덕적 판단으로부터 도덕적 동기가 반드시 따라나오지는 않는 사람, 즉 
무도덕자(amoralist)가 불가능하다는 내재주의적 주장이다. 스미스 식의 따옴표 반론에 
따르면, 무도덕자는 ‘도덕 개념들을 충분히 통달’하지 못한 것이다. 나는 이에 대해서 
스미스의 설명이 특정한 유형의 무도덕자, 즉 어느 순간부터 무도덕자가 된 사람을 
설명하지 못한다고 비판할 것이다. 또한 나는 따옴표 반론이 경험적인 사실에 주로 영향을 
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